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CHAPTER I 
Problem 
The purpose of this study was to determine the relation-
M ship between dogmatism and heterogeneity of power (the indepen-
1 dent variables) and the following dependent variables' 
I (1) morale (or satisfaction), (2) emergent leadership, (3) opinio1· change, (4) perceived productivity, (5) distribution of partici-
1 pation, (6) power and perceived amount of total communication, J 
and (7) power and perceived influence attempts. These variables I were studied in small groups 
, Interest in dogmatism 
consisting of three to five members. 
grew out of studies of the related 
concept of authoritarianism, which has been investigated by 
Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford. These writers 
constructed the California F. Scale to measure authoritarianism. 
There has been a great deal of criticism of this Scale, largely 
having to do with the contention that the Scale identifies right-
wing but not left-wing authoritarians. Milton Rokeach devised 
the Dogmatism Scale, which, in the opinion of this writer, does 
not suffer from aome of the limitations of the F Scale. Rokeach, 
in constructing this Scale, was interested more in the structure 
than in the content of beliefs. He states: "A person may adhere 
to Communism, Existentialism, Freudianism, or the 'New 
1 
conservatism' in a relatively open or in a relatively closed 
manner." (Rokeach, 1960, p. 87) For Rokeach, dogmatism is 
closed-mindedness, and non-dogmatism is open-mindedness. 
Some theoretical statements by Rokeach concerning the 
I i nature and meaning of dogmatism are of interest here. 
I~ (1963) states: 
Rokeach 
• • • we will now define dogmatism as (a) a rela-
~ tively closed cognitive organization of beliefs 
ii ~ and disbeliefs about reality, (b) organized around I a central set of beliefs about absolute authority 
m which, in turn, (c) provides a framework for pat-~.~ ~ terns of intolerance and qualified tolerance toward 
r others p. 159 • 
I 
~ ~ 
I I 
Rokeach (1963) further states: 
It is widely recognized, however, that authoritar-
ianism is also manifest among radicals, liberals, 
and middle of the readers as well as among conserv-
atives and reactionaries. Furthermore, authoritar-
ianism can be recognized as a problem in such aieas 
as science, art, literature, and philosophy, where 
f acism and ethnocentrism are not necessarily the 
main issues or may even be totally absent as issues 
• • • dogmatism, which is assumed to involve both 
authoritarianism and intolerance, need not neces-
sarily take the form of fascist authoritarianism 
or ethnic intolerance. It is thus seen that the 
total range of phenomena which may properly be 
regarded as indicative of authoritarianism is con-
siderably broader than that facet of authoritar-
ianism studied so intensively by the authors of 
The Authoritarian Personality • • • to a great extent 
authoritarianism cuts across specific ideological 
orientations ••• dogmatic authoritarianism may 
well be observed within the context of any ideo-
logical opientation, and in areas of human endeavor 
relatively removed from the political or religious 
arena. p. 166 • 
2 
f 
Dogmatism is one of the independent.variables in this 
study, the other being heterogeneity of power. This latter 
variable was manipulated by varying voting power in some groups 
(heterogeneous groups) but not in others (homogeneous groups). 
The manipulation of this variable is described in detail in the 
section on experimental procedure, and little need be said about 
it here. Suffice it to say that the assumption was made that 
the greater the number of votes a subject is able to cast, the 
greater is his power. 
Relatively few studies of heterogeneity of power have 
been conducted •. However, there have been a relatively large 
number of studies dealing with various other types of hetero-
geneity, e.g., heterogeneity of values, attitudes, interests, 
personality, intelligence, etc. There have been a number of 
studies of the effects of varying amounts of power (e.g., the 
effects of high, medium, and low power), but this is not what 
3 
is being investigated here, although it is related to it. A 
number of studies of heterogeneity have compared relatively 
homogeneous groups with relatively heterogeneous groups. In the 
present study, absolutely homogeneous groups (absolutely homo-
geneous only with respect to the variable being studied) were 
compared with absolutely heterogeneous groups (absolutely hetero-
geneous only with regard to the variable being studied). In 
4 
other words, in the homogeneous groups, there were no differences 
at all in voting power, whereas in the heterogeneous groups there 
were no similarities in voting power in the sense that no two 
members of a group had the same number of votes. By comparing 
two sets of groups which differed absolutely rather than rela-
tively it was thought that differences in regard to the dependent 
variables would more readily manifest themselves. 
There are, in a sense, two readily discernible types of 
heterogeneity. One is experimentally, i.e., artifically, created' 
heterogeneity, and the other is the natural type of heterogeneity 
! 
'Which is found outside the psychological laboratory, that is to 
say in "real life. 11 This type of heterogeneity, although found 
, outside the laboratory, may be studied within the laboratory and 
often is. For example, people are naturally heterogeneous with 
respect to intelligence, but such heterogeneity can rather easily 
be studied within the laboratory. 
is empirical justification for including data from both types of 
~ 
!power definition p. 153. 11 
I It is the belief of this experimenter that heterogeneity 
~of power in this study, although experimentally created, corre-
sponds to and is similar to naturally occurring types of hetero-
1
geneity of power. 
The variable of heterogeneity of power has practical sig-
lnificance. Many examples of groups which are heterogeneous in regard to power could be chosen. However, in order not to labor 
the point, only one example will be given. The interaction of a 
.group.of executives composed of members of lower, middle, and top 
management (heterogeneous power groups) will, in all probability, 
be considerably different from the interaction of 
lexecutives composed entirely of members of middle 
a group of 
managenien t 
(homogeneous power group) •. If these groups have the responsi-
l
bility of making decisions, the decisions are likely to differ, 
l
at least in some cases. Many other examples could be given, but 
the point should be clear that heterogeneity of power is a vari-
' 
lable that occlu:s in numerous, natural, "real life" situations and 
which is of considerable practical significance. 
5 
The basic design of this study was a 2 X 3 factorial exper 
,iment, the results of which were analyzed through use of analysis 
of variance. It is well known that through analysis of variance 
interaction effects as well as main effects are able to be 
• p 6 
' ----------------------..-.---------------------------------------.i 
I 
• ~ 
I 
~ 
I 
~ 
determined. Thus, it was possible to study the interaction 
between the heterogeneity of power variable and the dogmatism 
variable, which was of interest because of the strong possibility 
that reactions to differences in power would be influenced by the~ 
degree to which subjects were dogmatic. In other words, the 
interaction was of interest because the experimenter felt that it 
was quite conceivable that a relatively dogmatic person, with a 
typically authoritarian temperament, would react to the power 
hierarchy which was established in this experiment in a different 
manner than a relatively nondogmatic person, with a typically 
democratic temperament, and this study was designed, in part, to 
determine whether or not such differences would occur. 
The dependent variables measure three different dimensions 
of behavior: (1) subjects' reactions to the group discussion, 
(2) subjects' perceptions of the group discussion, and (3) sub-
jects• interactions duri~g the group discussion. The experi-
menter felt that there would be differences in all three of these 
areas, i.e., that homogeneous subjects would perceive, react, 
and interact differently from heterogeneous subjects, and that 
high dogmatism subjects would perceive, react, and interact 
differently from low dogmatism (or medium dogmatism) subjects • 
Thus, the dependent variables were designed to measure all three 
aspects of behavior. 
I 
I For the purposes of this study, dogmatism may be defined 
7 
Also for 
v 
fas dogmatism as measured by Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. 
~ ~ 
! 
i 
• ~ ~ 
I ~ I 
~ 
I 
r. ~ 
i p 
I 
~ 
~ 
• ~ 
~ 
I ~ 
I ~ 
the purposes of this study, heterogeneity of power may be defined 1 
as heterogeneity of voting power • 
F 
CHAPTER II 
Review of the Related Literature 
A number of studies of dogmatism have made it possible 
to obtain a fairly good picture of the "dogmatic" as opposed to 
It is, however, important to bear I the "non-dogmatic" individual. 
~ 
~ ~ 
~ 
n 
~ ~ 
in mind the fact that the term "dogmatic" in this context refers 
only to an arbitrary area on a continuum rather than to a dis-
crete category. This -writer has classified the studies on dog-
matism which are reviewed in this section into three categories: 
(1) dogmatism in relation to personality, (2) dogmatism in rela-
tion to learning and memory, and (3) dogmatism in relation to 
cognition. In other words, this -writer will attempt to answer 
~ the question: How does the "dogmatic" individual differ from 
the 11 non-dogmatic 11 individual as regards certain aspects of 
personality, learning and memory, and cognition? The three 
categories overlap to a considerable extent, particularly as I regards cognition and personality. 
i 
I ~ ~ I ~ 
The term 11 personality11 refers 
here mainly to the non-cognitive or dynamic aspects of person-
ality, i .e •I to its motivational and affective components. 
It is relatively easy to see how dogmatism in relation to 
personality and cognition are relevant to this study, but dog-
matism in relation to learning and memory does not appear to be 
8 
I 
, 
9 
i ~particularly relevant, and the question may arise as to why such f ~ r !studies have been included in this review of related literature. I 
~The answer is.twofold: (1) The writer is interested in con- I 
l
l'structing a general picture of the dogmatic individual, and such I 
studies, dealing as they do with such a critically important area i 
~ ~of human behavior, are necessary for the sake of completeness; 
~and (2) such studies are closely related to personality and 
~ 
~cognitive variables, and, in fact, the question often arises 
~ ,, 
" ~whether some types of "dogmatic behavior" are due to learning 
~ 
;and memory factors or to personality and cognitive factors. It 
~ ~is frequently very difficult to separate these two sets of 
f;factors as they relate to dogmatism. 
I ~ ~ By determining some of the major characteristics of dog-~ ~ 
lmatism, it will be possible to formulate a number of hypotheses 
!which are susceptible to experimental test. 
i · The first group of studies to be reviewed deals with dog- • 
i lmatism in relation to personality. 
I In a study by Zagona and Kelly (1966), high dogmatic §_s 
l 
!were compared to low dogmatic Ss on acceptance or rejection of a 
~ 
~novel and unorthodox musical-artistic presentation (jazz music 
jaccompanied by multi-colored, fast-moving geometric patterns). 
;High dogmatics demonstrated significantly greater dislike for 
lthe experience, as shown by rating scale and questionnaire 
~ 
p 
,• 
~responses. Art judgment did not differ significantly between 
i 
khe groups. 
I' I 
~ ~ 
Roberts and Hermann (1960) compared high and low scoring 
i ~Ss on the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale with respect to anomie and 
!time-perspective. They concluded that high dogmatics tend to 
bave imbalanced rather than future-oriented time perspectives, 
land because of their greater anomie,. are disturbed with regard 
!.; 
~to the future as well as with regard to the present. 
~ ~ ~ Kemp and Gratton (1961) found that college students who 
~ere low in dogmatism had fewer personal problems than did high 
~ . 
:dogmatic students. They also found that counselling was more 
~ 
10 
r: 
ieffective in reducing the number of such problems in the case of 
~l 
~low dogmatic students than in the case of high dogmatic students. 
~ 
~ Plant, Telford, and Thomas (1965) investigated person-
:1 
ality differences between dogmatic and non-dogmatic groups. In 
this study a battery of psychological tests, including the 
~ 
~Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (D Scale), five scales from the CPI, the 
~ 
~'. bStudy of Values (AVL), and the SCAT, was given to a large sample 
!of entering junior-college freslunen. In order to study and to 
,, 
i ~describe some of the ways in which highly dogmatic persons differ 
~from non-dogmatic persons, extreme groups on the D Scale were 
~ 
~chosen. Comparisons for these extreme groups were made on CPI 
fAvL. and SCAT scores. In addition, the comparisons on the CPI 
~ 
p 
~ and AVL were made for samples who had extreme scores on the D µ 
~ 
~ ~ ~, 
f. 
~ t/ 
~ I 
! 
i 
H 
~ 
scale but who were matched on aptitude-test score. Nondogmatic 
males compared with dogmatic males and nondogmatic females com-
pared with dogmatic females were found to differ significantly 
on each of the five CPI scales. Without exception, the nondog-
matic groups had the highest means on the CPI scales. It was 
11 
j 
~ ~ concluded that highly dogmatic .§.s were psychologically immature, 
~ ,, 
' ii ~ 
" 
and could be characterized as being impulsive, defensive, and 
conventional and stereotyped in thinking. 
' ~ I ~ ~ 
t 
ij Zagona and Zuc.her (1964) investigated interaction and role i 
~ 
~ 
I 
behavior in groups selected from the extremes of the open-closed 
cognitive continuum. In this study, two experimental groups of 
30 each were formed from both ends of a distribution of 517 
; Dogmatism Scale sc:ores. Each group made up a "conference 
section" in general psychology, and for a full semester, Es, 
acting also as section instructors, made systematic observations 
under normal classroom conditons and conducted small-group exper-
j iments with Ss drawn from these sections. In contrast to low-
I 
I ~ 
I 
I 
~ j 
dogmatics, high dogmatics were leader-oriented, inhibited, 
uncreative, unspontaneous, anxious, demanded structure in prob-
lem situations, and readily yielded to challenges from authority 
figures. 
f 
" 12 ~-· -------------------------------------=-------~ 
~ Hallenbeck and Lundstedt (1966) studied the effect of 
~ 
dogmatism on the adjustment to disability ·of 32 blind men. Denia] 
~ 
l 
was considered to be a sign of nonacceptance of the disability~ i 
and depression was considered to be a sign of acceptance. Anxiet1 
was hypothesized as the basic factor linking denial and dogn1atism1, 
i 
! i Type of onset, either gradual or sudden, was also correlated with~ 
~ I j degrees of denial and depression. Rating scales describing I 
1! f ~ denying and depressed behavior and judgment of tape-recorded I 
I 1· t, _) 
~ interviews measured the dependent variables. The findings were: i 
l ' (1) There was an inverse relationship between depression and ~ 
I i 
dogmatism; (2) There was a positive relationship between denial I 
~ 
and dogmatism; and (3) The sudden onset condition cancelled out 
the dogmatism-denial relatio4ship (i.e., only in the case of 
H 
~ ~ gradual onset was there a positive correlation of dogmatism and 
11 
~ 
~ 
~ ~ 
~ 
~ 
~ J 
~ ~ 
I~ 
i 
the denial tendency). 
The next group of studies has to do with dogmatism in 
relation to learning and memory. 
In a study by Erlich (1961), the effect of degree of 
dogmatism, as defined by Rokeach, upon learning in a classroom 
situation was tested on college §.s. It was hypothesized that if 
dogmatism implied a "closed cognitive structure" this could 
;~ 
J 
" 
,, 
•I 
~ 
·1 ~ ~1 
fj 
affect the capacity to learn, independently of academic aptitude. 
The results confirmed the hypothesis. 
~ 
f. 
I 
13 
f, 
I 
f1 
Pyron and Kafer (1967) conducted a study of the recall of 
:1 i nonsense and attitudinal rigidity. 
i 
In this study, 60 Ss first 
I 
~ ~ 
i 
~ 
I 
~ ~ 
!I 
heard 20 complete nonsense sentences read on tape. They then 
i 
attempted to recall the correct response element of each sentence I 
after hearing only the stimulus element. The sentences were con-
I 
with stimulus elements. An attempt was made to differentiate 10 I ! 
Recall of ~ 
structed in such a way that response elements were incongruent 
interesting from 10 uninteresting nonsense sentences. 
both kinds of nonsense was studied in relation to three measures I 
I I ~ of attitudinal rigidity: The Dogmatism Scale, the Change Inven- ~., ~ ~ 
I tory, and the original F Scale. .§.s who scored low (more open) on 1 ~ ~ .• 
'· dogmatism tend~d to recall significantly more interesting non- ~ ~ ! ; l ~sense sentence elements than §_s who scored high (more closed). ~ i ~ ~ Christensen (1963) conducted a study of dogmatism and 
learning with a sample of 166 students in an introductory 
psychology course and found no confirmation of Erlich's (1961) 
H ~ findings that the Dogmatism Scale predicts classroom learning. 
~ ~ 
~ 
I.< 
I 
! 
11 
~ 
~ 
" ~ ~ 
Christensen, however, found positive support for previous 
findings of the independence of dogmatism and aptitude. 
Workin~ from Rokeach's definition of a closed belief 
system, Baker (1964) developed a study to examine the relation-
ships of such a system in a setting wherein new materials were 
to be learned in a social learning and social adjustment setting. 
, 
'I 14 
I I ~ 
It was hypothesized that there are no differences: (1) in I 
b t · d' · d · · f e ween in ivi uals manifestin1 
i. 
learning of psychological concepts 
I 
~ open or closed belief systems (i.e., non-dogmatic and dogmatic i, I: 
~ 
H 
~ 
JI 
~ 
i 
~ I 
individuals), and (2) in intelligence between individuals mani-
festing open or closed belief systems. The first hypothesis 
was rejected, and the second hypothesis was confirmed. 
The next group of studies is concerned with dogmatism in 
j relation to cognition. 
' ~ 
! ~ 
Lo Scinto and Hartley (1963) conducted a study having to 
~ do with religious affilation and open-mindedness in binocular 
~ ! resolution. 
~ 
In this study, 20 .§_s, 10 Jewish and 10 Catholic, 
~ were exposed to a stereoscopic task and a test of open-minded-
~ ~ i ness. The stereoscopic task involved a series of 22 slides I pairing Jewish and Catholic symbols, words and pictures, exposed 
I under conditions of conflict, thus calling for some form of 
I binocular resolution by §_s • The test of. open-mindedness was I Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. There was a statistically significant 
! tendency to report seeing material associated with the "other 
~ ~ religion • 11 
I! 
Long and Ziller (1965) investigated dogmatism in relation 
i to predecisional informational search. In this study, 'Rokeach' s 
I~ Dogmatism Scale and four decision measures of tendencies to reserve judgement were administered to 72 freshman women. A 
I 
i 
I 
I 
i 
15 
~--------------------------------------------------------------~. " ! ~ significant negative relationship was found between dogmatism ~ 
• I ~ and each of the four decision measures. The non-dogmatic indi- I 
c ~I. ti ~ vidual tended to delay decision and engage in pre-decisional ! search, to require more time for psychophysical judgements, and I 
~ u ~ to respond "don't know" to statements of opinion under conditions~ 
.. 
fl 
of inadequate information. The authors interpreted dogmatism as I 
a defense mechanism which interferes with processing of pre- ~ 
I 
1 
I decisional information. 
Vidulich and Kaiman (1961), using the autokinetic phenom- l 
I 
enon, studied the relationship between the status assigned to the~ 
~ 
source of a communication and the degree of dogmatism of the 
receivers. It was found that the more dogmatic subjects 
attached greater importance to the status of the source of the 
communication than did the less dogmatic subjects. 
Rokeach and Vidulich (1960) conducted a study of dogma-
tism in relation to problem-solving. In this study, the 30 
college sophomores who, on the Dogmatism Scale, scored the 
highest (the closed-minded or dogmatic group) and the 30 who 
scored the lowest (the open-minded or non-dogmatic group) were 
selected from a pool of 249 students. Each of these subjects 
was tested individually on a problem which required that three 
commonly held beliefs be overcome and be replaced with three new 
beliefs, which must then be synthesized into a new cognitive 
16 
system. As predicted, the open-minded subjects were signifi-
cantly superior to the closed-minded subjects in mean time 
required to solve the problem. The superiority of the open- ! 
r: minded subjects was related to their greater ability to synthe- i 
~ r: ij size the new beliefs into a new cognitive system, this ability ~ 
~being related to a greater capacity to remember the beliefs, as I 
~ i ~ measured by post-experimental recall tests. This capacity, in ~ 
i I j turn, appeared to reflect the greater willingness of the open- i 
I ! 
~minded subjects to entertain novel and strange problems. Emo- t 
t i '.~~ tional rejection of the problem was found more frequently among ! 
t: .~ I the closed-minded subjects. ~ 
i f: I Rokeach, Swanson, and Denny (1960) found that closed- I 
i I ~ minded chess players performed equally as well as open-minded ! 
~chess players on chess-like problems. However, it was also found' I that closed-minded non-chess players were inferior to open-
~ 
I minded.non-chess players on the same problems. 
: Leckart and Wagner (1967) conducted a study of stimulus i familiarity dogmatism, and the duration of attention. In this g 
~ 
~ study, 38 males and 30 females viewed each of 30 black and white ; 
' photographs for as long as they wished. Half the photographs 
~ 
~.: 
~were judged by the Es to be unfamiliar to college students; the 
~ I remaining ones were judged familiar. After the looking task, all 
~ ~ .§_s completed the Dogmatism Scale. It was hypothesized that the 
p 17 
il 
open-minded §.s would spend more time looking at the novel stimuli i 
i 
than would the closed-minded §.s. The results failed to confirm 
this hypothesis. 
Miller (1965) investigated involvement and dogmatism as 
factorial design with 5 §.s per cell. §.s were selected from 
extreme quartiles of 800 high school students pre-tested on both 
dogmatism and attitude 'toward fluoridation. Half the §.s were 
experimentally involved in their position, and the other half 
~ 
8 were involved in an irrelevant issue. A taped discrepant com-
r 
~ munication on fluoridation, supposedly an interview with a pre-
~ 
~ H vious §.was presented to all §.s. 
, and dogmatism reduced the communication's persuasiveness, but 
As predicted, high involvement 
~ i involvement contributed most of the curtailment. Con §.s who were. 
~ I both dogmatic and relevantly involved gave significantly more 
! ~ boomerang responses. 
I A study by Costin ( 1968} found that dogmatic §.s showed no 
~ ~ greater resistance to learning general principles of behavior I than did non-dogmatic §.s. However, dogmatic §.s were more resist-I 
~ ant to changing specific false beliefs about human nature than I 
~ were non-dogmatic §.s. 
~ 
support Rokeach's view that the Dogmatism Scale does measure 
The author concluded that the results 
.. 
18 
~general authoritarianism, rather than simple-mindedness and its 
~I 
r; 
~consequent acquiescence. 
I It would now be well to consider the hypotheses which are 
~ 
!indicated by these studies. On theoretical grounds alone, it 
~would seem reasonable to expect less opinion change among dog-
r: 
~ 
~matic persons, for such persons, by definition, adhere strongly 
ij 
~ 
'to their opinions and are reluctant to change them. However, 
~in addition to these t,heoretical considerations, a number of the 
~ 
~ 
]empirical studies which this writer has already reviewed 
,, 
" ~ 
!l<Rokeaoh and Vidulich, 1960; Miller, 1965; and Costin, 1968) 
s ' 
~justify the following hypothesis: The greater an individual's 
,, 
" g 
~dogmatism, the greater is his resistance to opinion change. Dog-
~matism in this context refers to dogmatism as measured by 
~ ~Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. 
I 9 The Dogmatism Scale is basically a measure of authoritar-,. 
~ ~ianism, and authoritarian persons tend to be leader-oriented. 
i 
~lThis is a well"."'known fact, although it is brought out in only one 
~ 
!of the studies which have been reviewed in this section (Zagona 
~and Zucher, 1964). The following hypothesis can therefore be 
g 
lformulated: The greater the dogmatism of the members of small 
Leadership will emerge in highly dogmatic groups 
~groups, the greater is the incidence of emergent leadership in 
~ 
lthose groups. 
lin response to the members' need for such leadersh.ip. 
,,. 
The -writer would now like to review a number of studies 
to do with the effects of homogeneity vs. heterogeneity, 
~especially as regards productivity, morale, and conununication. 
~ 
~ 1 Exline and Ziller (1959) conducted a study of status 
~ l; 
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~congruency and interpersonal conflict in decision-making groups. 
~ 
" ~In this study, 20 groups of three female students were rated 
! 
~with respect to status dimensions of ability and ·voting power. 
~j 
t!status-congruent (homogeneous) groups were found to be more con-
,. 
' f.: 
~genial, characterized by less interpersonal conflict, superior in 
t1 
f· 
i'task performance, and characterized by greater discussion agree-
i! 
~ ~ment than status-incongruent (heterogeneous) groups. Disagree-
n 
~ "ment was not found to be related to status congruency. 
,, 
Hoffman (1950) conducted a study of homogeneity of member 
~personality and its effect on group probiem solving~ In this 
~ ~study, the capacity to solve problems was studied in two groups, 
~ 
lone composed of .§.s with similar personalities (as measured by 
~ ~the Guilford-Zinunerman Temperament Survey), the homogeneous group, 
,, 
~ 
land a heterogeneous group. It was found that heterogeneity of 
~ ~personality was associated with high productivity. On the task 
ij 
! 
~with purely objective criteria (mined road problem), Hoffman 
~ 
~found that heterogeneous groups produced solutions of signifi-
11 ~cantly higher quality. The difference was not significant on 
I ~the task primarily requiring consensus. The author concluded 
f; 
~ 
.. 
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~ d t' f . 1 . lthat the pro uc ion o creative so utions to a 
!facilitated by a multiplicity of perceptions. 
! 
,, 
I 
! 
! 
l 
problem is 
The superiority 
lof heterogeneous groups has been 
" 
further demonstrated in a second ! 
lstudy which used a wider range of tasks (Hoffman and Maier, 
1, 
) i 1961 ·I 
I ~ 
Festinger and Thibaut (1951) present some evidence that 
hperceptions of heterogeneity lead to subgroup formation. They 
' ; 
ifound that (with low pressure toward uniformity) a greater per-
F, 
~ception of heterogeneous group composition produced a decrease in 
• ! 
~the tendency to communicate to deviant group members. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
Gerard (1953) conducted a study which was concerned with 
fithe effects of variations in perceived group homogeneity with 
~respect to task ability and pressures to help achieve a group 
I• ,, 
k 
~solution on influence processes. In order to 
~; 
contrast homogeneity! 
! ~ 
~with heterogeneity, members of some groups were instructed that 
lall members had equal task skills and members of other groups 
~ 
" ~that there were marked differences in member skills. 
i 
~ 
I 
Within each I 
! ~iof these conditions, high and low pressures toward uniformity ~ 
~were applied by informing some but not other groups that they 
• !1 
~would later have to defend their group opinions. Groups were I . 
~compared in terms of opinion change and patterns of communication. , 
~ ~With respect to number of communications and number of 11 influence 11 
~ ~conununications, the data showed little consistent evidence of 
~ 
!differences between groups varying in perceived homogeneity of 
~ 
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abilities and pressures toward uniformity. A greater tendency ~ 
I 
I 
i 
toward the formation of subgroups was found in groups perceived 
as being heterogeneous. 
I Schutz (1958) conducted a study having to do with "funda- I 
mental interpersonal relations orientations. 11 Schutz disting- ~ 
uished two basic orientations -·a power orientation and a personal! 
' 
orientation. By means of attitude scales, Schutz was able to ! 
~compose groups which were either compatible (homogeneous) or 
!incompatible (heterogeneous) with respect to these fundamental 
!interpersonal orientations. The compatible groups were either 
! 
ipower orientated or personal orientated. Incompatible groups 
~were formed with two subgroups, each of which was centered about 
,l 
'a "focal person. 11 
I 
Both focal persons were relatively high in 
Rdominance, but one subgroup leader and his supporting member were 
llow in personalness, and the other subgroup members were high in 
lpersonalness. In general, Schutz found that incompatible groups 
lperform less effectively. This decrement was most severe for 
r, 
~tasks which required the most interaction and agreement and under 
g 
~conditions of high time pressure. 
~ In a study by Cattell, Saunders, and Stice (1953) 80 ten-
~ 
r ~man groups were tested on a wide variety of tasks. It was found 
,, 
!j 
~that accuracy of group judgments was higher in groups hetero-
~ 
~geneous in the personality traits of surgency, radicalism, 
' 
i 
i 
~ 
il 
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l ~character integration, and adventuresomeness. But in these same 
~ 
J! 
~arouos, heterogeneity in sensitivity, suspiciousness, and aggres-
;J .... ~ 
~siveness resulted in slowness .in decision making and a feeling 
t· 
" ' ~of blockage of goal achievement. 
r. 
In a study by Carter and Haythorn (1956) creative groups 
:) 
' !which were homogeneous and heterogeneous in authoritarian 
r. 
' Jattitudes were compared. The homogeneous groups, relative to the 
~ 
~ f f . . ~heterogeneous groups, were ound to be riendlier and to have 
r: 
1;higher morale. The members of heterogeneous groups, conversely, 
" !1 
iwere observed to exhibit more conflict and competition. A 
" fi 
~greater tendency toward clique formation was also found in the 
~ 
1;heterogeneous groups • 
~ 
The clearest evidence for higher morale in homogeneous 
lgroups is found in the studies of Exline and Ziller (1959) and 
!carter and Haythorn (1956). In addition, the studies by Festigner 
i ~and Thibaut (1951), and Gerard (1953) found that heterogeneity or 
11 ~ ~perceptions of heterogeneity lead to subgroup formation, which is 
~ 
~indicative of lower group cohesiveness and thus of lower morale. 
~ ~The following hypothesis can therefore by formulated: Morale is 
~ 
~ ~higher in homogeneous groups than in heterogeneous groups. 
Ii ~ As regards homogeneity and productivity, Exline and Ziller 
¥ 
i(l959) and Schutz (1958) found homogeneous groups to be more 
~ ~productive, whereas Hoffman (1959) and Hoffman and Maier (1961) 
i 
! ' 
lfound heterogeneous groups to be more productive. Cattell, ~ 
' lsaunders, and Stice (1953) found that homogeneity in certain 
t 
~characteristics leads to superior performance, and heterogeneity 
~ ~ ~in other characteristics leads to superior performance. Because 
!of the conflicting and ambiguous findings (or at least the lack 
!of clear-cut findings) in this area, this writer has not formu-
~ 
~lated a hypothesis concerning actual or perceived productivity in 
Ii 
g 
~relation to group heterogeneity. 
~ 
1 ~ 
~ 
.. 
Heterogeneity of power vs. homogeneity of power is, in 
~this study, an absolute type of comparison, for there are no 
~ 
rpower differences at all within the homogeneous groups. This 
i 
ij 
tstudy is also concerned with relative comparisons between group 
~ 
1! 
~members with varying amounts of power. 
j 
Li th: (1). dogmatism in relation to the correlation between 
More specifically, this study is concerned, in part, 
I 
!amount of power and perceived amount of total communication, and 
1
(2) dogmatLsm in relation to the correlation between amount of 
11
power and perceived influence attempts. It would, therefore, be 
~ ~well to review a number of studies having to do with amount of 
~power in relation to communication and influence attempts. After 
~ 
lthese studies are reviewed, consideration will be given to the 
,1 
~ 
ipossible effects of dogmatism upon these relationships. 
" 
A number of studies indicate that high power persons com-
1 municate more than do low power persons. 
I , I Gerard (1957) found that Ss who were given positions of 
l1eadership and authority communicated more than did other §_s. 
l Borgotta (1954) found that §_s who thought they had high 
~ ~ 
ipower-status (in this case Ss who expected to receive sociometric 
~ 
ichoices from others) communicated more than persons who thought 
5 ,, 
~ lithey had low power-status (in this case §_s who did not expect to 
I 
~receive sociometric choices from others). 
~ 
~ Hurwitz, Zander, and Hymovitch (1953) conducted a study in 
ii 
N 
!J which persons received a pre-conference rating which was com-~ 
1 
;pleted by two local people qualified to estimate the status 
' ~accorded these persons by persons in the same profession. It 
~ ~was found that high power Ss, as determined by the pre-conference 
'l 
~ ~rating, communicated more than low power Ss. 
d ~ Lana, Vaughan, and McGinnies (1960) conducted a study of 
r 
~leadership and friendship status as factors in discussion group 
~ ~interaction. In this study, sociometric choices on friendship 
l 
~ ~and leadership criteria were made on members of two community 
!groups who engaged in three discussion sessions concerning 
lmental health films. Indices of friendship and leadership status 
~ 
~were obtained from these groups and related to an index of verbal 
N 
~ 
!activity, labeled interaction status. Leadership status and 
~---------------------~2~5 
: interaction status were highly correlated, as were leadership 
status and friendship status. Friendship status and interaction 
status, however, were not correlated. Those discussion partici-
pants who were relatively low in leadership status directed their 
comments to those members whom they identified as leaders. It 
was concluded that friendship status does not influence an 
individual's interaction status with the small discussion group. 
It was further concluded that discussion of a corrnnunication in 
jthe small group situation is largely confined to the perceived 
leaders of the group. 
I Mussen and Porter (1959) found that subjects rated effec-
~tive by their peers after a brief leaderless discussion were 
1
1
-characterized by a high frequency of participation. 
, In an experiment where the only corrnnunication was through 
written letters, Shaw and Gilchrist (1956) found a correlation 
between number of letters written and leadership rankings. 
Bates (1952) conducted a study of some sociometric aspects 
of social rankings in a small, face-to-face group. By means of 
~questionnaires, tape recordings, and observation, two hypotheses 
!were tested. The conclusion was that the greater the conformity 
~ ~of an individual to group norms, the higher will be his social 
~ 
lrank. The other hypothesis concerning the origination of action 
~for others did not lead to definite conclusions. However, Bates 
26 
found a correlation of .85 between the amount of corrununications 
sent and sociometric ranking on who 11 contributed the most to 
carrying out the assigned task of the group. 11 Borgotta and Bales 
~(1956) found a correlation of .SO between similar measures. 
~ 
I 
i 
It would now be well to consider a number of studies 
ihaving to do with the relationship between amount of power and 
~ ~influence attempts. 
i Levinger (1959) found that high power subjects initiated . ~ I 
• more influence attempts than low power subjects. Three separate I 
~easures of power were used in this study. Subjects who were told! 
lt.~at they were more competent than their partners, subjects whose I 
~,',1.:.nartner was more accepti"ng of i  their suggestions, and subjects who . 
~ 
' ~ad high perceived power were rated by observers as making more 
i 
'influence attempts and having a higher degree of assertiveness 
~than other subjects. 
I 
French and Snyder (1959) conducted a study in which in-
" 
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" I 
I 
~found 
n 
t; 
~more well-liked officers) were 
I' 
r, 
~ . . d ff. cnon-corrunissione 0 icers. 
t' 
r, 
that high power non-com.~issioned officers (in this case, 
more influential than low power 
is clear from the preceding studies that high power 
I 
This statement I 
l 
I It 
~persons conununicate more than low power persons. 
~ ~is supported by the following studies: Gerard (1957), Borgotta 
~(1954), Hurwitz, Zander and Hymovitch (1953), Lana, Vaughan, and 
~ 
;l.McGinnies (1960), Mussen and Porter (1959), Shaw and Gilchrist 
I 
I 
' rt ! This writer l 
I 
I . 
!(1956), Bates (1952), and Borgotta and Bales (1956). 
~ 
·i . 
/would therefore expect a rather high positive correlation between 
~ 
~ ~~~ount of power and amount of conununication. However, this study i 
bi ~ ~ ! 
r:is investigating the perceived amount of conununication in relation~ 
ito amount of power rather than the actual amount of connnunication I 
1!in relation to amount of power. (In order to avoid confusion, it I 
l! t. ~should be pointed out that this study uses two separate and I ~ . I ~distinct measures of conununication. One of these measures, the 1 
~perceived amount of conununication, and this measure is being I 
~ i1discussed here. The other measure of conununication measures the 
•i ~ ~actual amount of conununication in order to determine the distri-
~ 
~bution of participation in the various groups. This latter 
'I ~ 
~measure of communication, however, has nothing to do with amount 
~of power and is not being discussed here. In other words, it is 
lj 
1the subjective rather than the objective measure of communication 
·which is being discussed here.) 
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' 
This writer believes that there is a close but not neces- ri 
' 
fsarily perfect correspondence between actual and perceived amountsi 
!of communication, i.e., he believes that the subjects' perceptions!~ 
lare, in this case, relatively accurate. If this is true, then it i 
i I ~would be expected that there would be a fairly high positive cor- I 
I 
I 
relation between amount of power and perceived amount of total 
What is of interest here, however, is the effect ~communication. 
r 
iof dogmatism upon this relationship, and in this writer's . . I 
~ 
opinion, I 
I ~there is not sufficient empirical evidence to warrant the f ormu-
~ 
~ ~lation of a hypothesis concerning such an effect. 
Levinger (1959) found that high power subjects initiated 
':more influence attempts than low power subjects; Lippitt et. al. 
r:(1952) found that subjects who were perceived as possessing high 
~ bower initiated more influence attempts than others; and French 
!j 
r 1and Snyder (1959) found that high power subjects were more 
il 
~influential than others, possibly due to the initiation of more 
!influence attempts. It would therefore seem reasonable to expect 
= 
,, 
~la positive correlation between amount of power and perceived 
~ f • f 1 t • • h h b • t I 'amount o in uence attemp s, assuming again t at t e su ]ec s 
f,Perceptions are relatively accurate. However, as was the case 
' 
~ 
!with the conununication variable, there is not sufficient empiricali 
Lvidence to warrant the.formulation of a hypothesis concerning the 
effect of dogmatism upon this relationship. 
I 
I ~ 
I 
i 
I ~ 
CHAPTER III 
Method 
~Sub-iects 
f. ~ ~ ~ 
r, 
The subjects in this study were 120 male students enrolled 
lin the introductory psychology course at the Lake Shore Campus of 
~Loyola University. The majority were freshmen, although a nu.iLlber I . ! 
~were sophomores, juniors, or seniors, and most were 18 or 19 years:, 
~ ' '! 
! ~of age. ~ 
~ The design of this study requirec preliminary testing in {; 
~ 
'larder to classify each potential subject into one of three levels 
f: ~ . 
B • (h . h d. ) . I ;,of dogmatism ig , me ium, or low • Accordingly, Rokeach s 
~~ 
n 
~ . ~Dogmatism Scale was administered to 258 male students enrolled in 
I 
::the introductory psychology course at Loyola University. One 
I 
·~group of subjects (the low dogmatism subjects) was selected from 
' ~ ~among those students who scored in the lower third on the Dogrna-
~1 
~tism Scale; a second group of subjects (the medium dogmatism 
!subjects) was selected from among those students who scored in the. 
i ~iddle third on the Dogmatism Scale; and a third group of subjects 1 
~ ~(the high dogmatism subjects) was selected from among those 
r: 
' ~students who scored in the upper third on the Dogmatism Scale. 
~Scores in the lower third ranged from -110 to -21; scores in the 
~middle third ranged from -20 to +l; and scores in the upper third 
f,: 
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30 I ,__, ______________________ __,......,...._.....,,__._.........,...,.... ....... ......,..,__...._. __ ..._ ____ ,_....., .................. .....,._..,j 
;1 
kanged from +2 to +64. 
g 
!and standard deviations 
1 
Table I presents the group sizes, means, 
for the scores obtained by students 
I 
' ~ i 
'  ! ~ . ~tested on the Dogmatism 
~ 
Scale for each level of dogmatism and for i 
~all levels combined. 
,, 
The experiment was set up in such a way that it appeared 
~to the subjects to be three separate experiments. Three sign-up 
~ ~ 
~folders were used, each of the folders containing an alphabetical 
~·~ 
" 
hist of ~l the students eligible to serve in that particular experi-
' it ,, 
~mental condition (which was either a high, medium, or low dogma-
~tism condition, altho~gh it was, of course, not identified as 
-1 ~ 
fjsuch to the subjects). From the student's point of view, each 
~ 
~list appeared to contain the names of students eligible for a ~ 
'1 
ijparticular experiment rather than a particular experimental con-
!i 
ii 
:id·t· 
" i ion. 
~ 
The restrictions specified on the sign-up folders were: 
~ 
11(1) the student's name must be on the list, and (2} each subject 
~ 
!could participate in the experiment only once. 
11 ii 
~ Although, ideally, it would have been desirable, for a ~ tnumber of reasons, to have groups of equal size, it was not 
fl 
11 
~possible to accomplish this. It was therefore necessary to use 
lgroups of three, four, or five members, a situation which was not 
"' ~ 
!ideal but which in no way violated the basic design of this 
iexperiment. In a number of cases, fewer than three students 
signed up and reported to the experimental room for a given 
' I
I 
I 
! 
I 
! 
! 
! 
~ 
i 
I ! 
I 
! 
I 
! 
I 
! 
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! ~ ~ ! ~ TABLE 1 I ! Means and Standard Deviations for Scores Obtained by II 
i I Students Tested on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale I 
~ ~ ~ i 
;..!! ------------------------------------[) 
~----------------------------------~, ! 
Group Mean t i ;...------------------------------------~ i 
1Low Dogmatism ~ 
., 
,, 
~ . . ~Medium Dogmatism 
., 
.'1 
~High Dogmatism 
Sample 
86 
86 
86 
258 
-39.54 
- 9.40 
15.41 
-11.29 
15.68 
5.52 
11.58 
28.05 
~ 
f 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~1 
:
1 experimental session, and it was not possible to run groups in 
" 
;'such cases. A number of students (fewer .than 10% of the total) 
~i 
':who reported to the experimental room were not eligible to par-
~l 
l~ticipate in that particular condition, i.e., their names did not 
['appear on the appropriate list. The experimenter was able to 
ti 
~i 
'identify and eliminate the majority of these students. However, 
i! 
! 
!i 
Ga post-experimental check revealed that two of the 120 subjects 
:jwho had served in the experiment were not eligible for the par-
ticular condition in which they had served. 
In summary, the score which a subject received on the 
~Dogmatism Scale determined the condition to which he was 
~ 
~assigned (high, medium, or low dogmatism condition), and the 
" 
, 
~ ~particular group in which he served was determined by a process 
" k 
• ~of random selection. In regard to the heterogeneity variable, 
" 
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~ ~the assignment of subjects to homogeneous or heterogeneous groups 
'· ~1 ,, 
" ~was also determined by a process of random selection. 
~ ij Table 2 presents the distribution of groups and sub]ects 
11 i ~~~ong the six experimental treatments. r, 
~ 
fi 
~Apparatus 
ti 
~ The apparatus used in this experiment was as follows: 
~ 
ij ~(l) The Dogmatism Scale (used only in preliminary testing), (2) a 
:1 
lhu.~an relations problem, (3) a tape recorder, (4) sheets contain-
J 
~ing numbers from one to 300, (5) cards with identifying letters 
TABLE 2 
Distribution of Groups and Subjects 
among Experimental Treatments 
i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
~ I Treatments 
~ ~ 
Groups Subjects 
1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
~ 
~ 
~Heterogeneous 
~ 
~ . ~High Dogmatism 
~ 
l 
iMedium Dogmatism ~ ~ 
I.Low Dogmatism 
~: j 
~Homogeneous 
ijHigh Dogmatism 
~ ~Medium Dogmatism 
~ ~ ~Low Dogmatism 
i 
5 21 
5 24 
5 16 
5 21 
5 19 
5 19 
30 120 
rr-. . 
"'. land votes, and ( 6) a questionnaire constructed by the experi-
: . benter. The Dogmatism Scale is described in the appendix. 
! 
The Dogmatism Scale is scored simply by adding up the I 
!scores on the individual items to obtain a total score. T.his 
~score may be either positive or negative. Since each stata~ent 
H 
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~supposedly indicative of dogmatism, the higher the positive score, 
~ ~t' ~ ne 
~ 
greater is the amount of dogmatism, and the higher the nega-
g 
1tive score, the lower is the amount of dogmatism. 
~ 
~I 
~ The human relations problem reads as follows: 
Sam, a student in the eighth grade, is, in the words 
of his principal, "A bad case who is headed for the 
juvenile court." The principal would like to expel 
Sam, but hesitates to do so because Sam's father is 
influential in the town. The principal has tried 
everything with Sam ~ called him down, pleaded with 
him, made him sit in the office with his face to the 
wall, used corporal punishment, called Sam's parents, 
and placed him on probation. Sam still remains im-
pudent and truant. The principal has written Sam's 
mother, asking her to come to the school to talk over 
Sam's behavior, but she phoned to say she is too busy 
and has no time to bother with his school problems. 
Sam is at present on probation. What should be done 
with Sam? The following are suggested solutions: 
A. Send Sam to a psychiatrist, child psy-
chologist, or social welfare counselor. 
B. Try to stimulate Sam toward goals which 
might gain him greater acceptance. 
c. Try to get his parents to realize the 
seriousness of the situation. 
D. The whole family should be sent to a 
psychiatrist, psychologist, or social 
welfare counselor. 
E. Attempt to determine why he is the way 
he is, and institute a campaign to cor-
rect the reason. 
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Cards with the letters A, B, C, D, and E were placed in i 
' 
front of subjects in the homogeneous groups for purposes of iden- ! 
1tification. In the heterogeneous groups, the writing on the cards I 
Las ~s follows: A-1 vote; B-2 votes, C-3 votes, D-4 votes, and 
b-5 votes. 
i A tape recorder with a counter was used to record the ~ ~roup discussions. 
Sheets containing numbers from 1 to 300 were used during i i ~each group discussion to record the interaction of the subjects. 
~ 
.~ 
. ~ 
! 
After the group discussion had ended, a questionnaire con-
istructed by the experimenter was administered to the subjects. 
~ Ii 1 
11The questionnaire was as follows: 
~ 
I, 
f:Name 
bo. of votes 
ij 
QUESTIONNAIRE I~ ~. Final individual ranking. I 
n 
~ ~ 
~ ~ 
~ 
,, 
~ ~ 
Rank the solutions from best (1) to poorest (5). This is an 
individual ranking rather than a group ranking and is similar 
to the first ranking, which was completed prior to the dis-
cussion. The purpose of this ranking is to determine the 
effect of the group discussion upon opinions. 
Solution 
A 
B 
Rank 
I 
, 
! 
Solution 
c 
D 
E 
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Rank 
i 
~ B. 
[1 
Indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the 
I. 
~ ~ following statements by checking the appropriate space. 
i fl ll ____ _ 
istrongly 
~ agree 
' 
~ 
n 
~ 
ti 
~--­
!strongly 
~disagree 
d 
G 
I ~ i ~-----i;strongly 
~disagree 
~ 
ti 
~ 
I\ ; 
~----~strongly 
~ agree 
8 ~: 
~ ~ ~-----!strongly 
~disagree 
1. I was satisfied with the group ranking. 
moderately 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
moderately 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
2. I was satisfied with the group discussion. 
moderately: 
disagree · 
mildly 
disagree 
mildly 
agree 
moderately 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
3. The group discussion could be described as 
friendly. 
moderately 
disagree 
mildly 
disagree 
mildly 
agree 
moderately 
agree 
strongly 
agree 
4. The group discussion could be described as 
hostile and antagonistic. 
moderately 
agree. 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
5. The task bored me. 
moderately 
disagree 
mildly 
disagree 
mildly 
agree 
moderately 
disagree 
moderately 
agree 
strongly 
disagree 
strongly 
agree 
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~ 6. 
r 
~ 
The task was enjoyable for me. ~ ! ~-----
tstrongly I agree moderately agree mildly agree mildly disagree moderately disagree 
)j 
strongly ! 
disagree I 
I 
" 
Ii 
a 
7. The task was meaningless insofar as I was ~ 
i 
~ I concerned. 
i 
!strongly 
~ agree 
moderately 
agree 
mildly 
agree 
mildly 
disagree 
moderately 
disagree 
strongly 
disagree 
~ 
t k. 
' ~ ~ 
~ 
;1 
i 
i 
Was there some individual in the group who could be described 
as the leader of the group? (a) Yes (b) No. (Circle the 
letter of the correct answer.) 
Rate all the members of the group (including yourself) as to 
their amount of communication (both verbal and nonverbal) by 
using the following scale. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
A ____ _ 
No communication 
Very small amount of communication 
Small amount of communication 
Moderate amount of communication 
Large amount of communication 
Very large amount of comrriunication 
B c D _____ _ E 
How productive, in your opinion, was the group discussion: 
(Check the appropriate space.) 
extremely productive 
generally productive 
neither productive nor unproductive 
generally unproductive 
totally unproductive 
To what extent did each member of the group try to exert 
pressure to force the other members to accept his solutions? 
ii 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
I ! 
i 
i 
I 
I 
, 
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--------------------------------------------------------------..., 
1. Not at all 
2. Slightly 
3. Somewhat 
4. Quite a bit 
5. Extremely 
Rate each of the group members (including yourself) using 
the above scale. 
A ____ _ B c ____ _ D 
-----
E ____ _ 
It would now be well to consider the scoring procedures I ~for the questionnaire and the measure of the distribution of 
~ jparticipation. These procedures have reference only to the raw 
' . [;data; actual statistical procedures are presented in a later 
~ 
t . 
!section. In regard to the items measuring morale (the B items), the i 
r,more a response indicated high morale, the. higher the score it 
~received. Each response received a score between one and six. 
lFor example, if a subject checked "strongly agree" in response 
~ ! ~to the statement: 
~ 
11 I was satisfied with the group ranking," this 
~response would receive a score of six; the response "strongly 
~ ~ 
idisagree" would receive a score of one, and intermediate responses 
ft j
1
would receive intermediate scores ( 2, 3, 4, or 5) • 
! ~ For items C (emergent leadership), the number of "yes" \' ~responses was tabulated for each group and was divided by the 
! ~total number of responses to this question in order to obtain a 
ij 
~score for each group. 
f 
i 
~ 
As regards item E (perceived productivity), the response i ~ 
~ l"extremely productive" received a score of five; the response 
~ ! "generally productive" received a score of four; the response 
I ~"neither productive nor unproductive" received a score of three; 
~the response "generally unproductive 11 received a score of two; 
~ 
~ 
jand the response "totally unproductive" received a score of one. 
39 
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:i 
i 
I 
i 
n 
" 
' 
,, 
i 
~ 
! 
~ 
~ ~ 
i In regard to the measure of the distribution of participa- ~ 
a count was made of the number of times each subject's I 
~ 
1 
appeared on the number sheets, thus providing each subject 
; 
,, 
::with a raw score on this measure. 
~ ~ 
'i ! Scoring procedures for the other items are virtually self-
1explanatory. 
~ 
For the measure of opinion change (measured by the 
i• 
:\initial individual ranking and item A) , and for i tern D (power 
~ 
'~and perceived amount of total communication) and item F (power 
~ ~nd perceived influence attempts), the numbers written by the ~ t 
t;subjects were the raw scores. 
~ 
"Procedure i 
~I ~ Before the experiment could begin, it was necessary to 
~ ~determine whether the particular human relations problem which 
~ 
~ad been chosen would evoke sufficient variability of responses 
~ 
~to permit a meaningful group discussion centered around a mean-
~ 
l!ingful task. If it was found that people tended to agree too 
~ 
~ 
ruch on the ranks of the suggested solutions, the human relations 
1 
t ,, 
~ 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
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,_.,..,,,.- -------------------------------------"";' ~ ~oroblem would have to be discarded and replaced with one which 
i·..i,. 
~as capable of stimulating sufficient controversy among the mem-
,1 
~ 
:'hers of a group. The human relations problem was therefore 
t]administered to 62 male and female students enrolled in an under-
tgraduate psychology course at Loyola University. None of these 
f, 
~students, it should be pointed out, were eligible to serve in the 
\-;ontemplated experiment. 
u 
Table 3 presents the percentages of 41 male students who 
fassigned particular ranks to each of the solutions- to the human 
(:relations problem. The letters in the vertical column at the 
,, 
~ 
11extreme left of the Table represent the letters designating each 
)1 
•' 
!of the solutions. 
n 
1: 
~able designate the 
t! 
>i 
' 
The numbers from one to five at the top of the 
ranks which were assigned to each of the 
tsolutions. Table 4 presents, in similar fashion, the 
' ~ 
pf responses for the 21 female students, and Table 5 
~ 
distribution~ 
presents the 
I ~ 
nistribution of responses for the total sample of 62 male and 
~ 
f 
tfemale students. 
~ 
It is apparent from inspection of these Tables 
~ 
~ ~that there was sufficient variability of responses to warrant the 
~ 
rse of this particular human relations problem. 
~ ~! 
l 
In this study, there were three levels of the dogmatism 
factor and two levels of the heterogeneity of power factor. There 
~ere, therefore, six treatment combinations: (1) low dogmatism, 
~ ~ 
omogeneous groups; (2) low dogmatism, heterogeneous groups,; 
41 
TABLE 3 
Distribution of Responses (in Percentages) to 
Human Relations Problem of 
41 Male Students 
,j 
I ,, 
~ Rank 
i 
1 
1 2 3 4 5 
--------------------------------------f' 
~Solution 
~ ~ (i 
~ A 7.3 14.6 ~ [' 
i; 
~ 
• 2.4 12.2 ~ B ~ c 26.8 26.8 • ,., 
ij 
I D 19.5 34.1 
E 43.9 14.6 
31.7 31.7 
19.5 22.0 
26.8 14.6 
7.3 12.2 
12.2 19.5 
14.6 
43.9 
4.9 
26.8 
9.8 
I 
~ !l 
1, 
1 
8 i 
I 
TABLE 4 
Distribution of Responses (in Percentages) to 
Human Relations Problem of 
21 Female Students 
l 
I 
! 
,j 
i 
i 
Ii 
I 
! 
i 
:i 
~ 
! 
I 
i 
~ 
I 
! 
! 
~ ~================================R=a=n=k================================1 
2 3 4 5 I ~~~~~~~~~~~~~-1 
I 
" 
1 
~ 
~Solution 
~ 
A 14.3 19.0 23.8 28.6 14.3 
B 4.8 19.0 33.3 19.0 23.8 
c 28.6 23.8 14.3 23.8 9.5 
D 14.3 23.8 9.5 4.8 47.6 
E 38.l 14.3 19.0 23.8 4.8 
TABLE 5 
Distribution of Responses (in Percentages) 
to Human Relations Problem of 
62 Male and Female Students 
Rank 
1 2 3 4 5 
A 9.7 16.1 29.0 30.6 14.5 
B 3.2 14.5 24.2 21.0 37.1 
c 27.4 25.8 22.6 17.7 6.5 
D 17.7 30.6 8.1 9.7 33.9 
E 41.9 14.5 14.5 21.0 8.1 
I; 
I·' ! : 
' 
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i(3) medium dogmatism, homogeneous groups; (4) medium dogmatism, 
;heterogeneous groups; ( 5) high dogmatism, homogeneous groups; and 
1(6) high dogmatism, heterogeneous groups. 
i 
~ 
n 
l 
The task of the subjects was to rank in order of ~ preferencej 
i 
i lboth individually and as a group, various solutions to a human 
relations problem. The group ranking was determined by majority 
0vote. 
I 
In the homogeneous groups each subject had one vote, 
~hereas in the heterogeneous groups dif f eren~ subjects had 
~ ~ 
I 
• I 
I 
~ 
i 
I 
I 
separatelyr 
' 
~different numbers of votes. Each solution was voted on 
•I 
! l1As regards the heterogeneous groups, the votes were distributed 
~ 
~ jas follows: (1) In groups consisting of three members, .[&A, B, 
~ . aC, sub]ect A had one vote, subject B had two votes, and subject C 
~ ~had three votes; ( 2) 
~! g 
in groups consisting of four members, .[s, A, 
~ ~B, C, and D, subject A had one vote, subject B had two votes, 
a 
'sub]'ect C had three votes, and subject D had four votes; (3) in 
w 
~ 
" 
! 
~ 
~groups consisting of five members, Ss, A, B, C, D, and 
~ 
~A had one vote, subject B had two votes, subject C had 
~ 
,! 
1
Jsubject D had four votes, and subject E had five votes. 
E, subject J• 
three votes , 
~ 
u 
! 
~ 
,. 
~ ..... h ~1... .. e 
,1 
Heterogeneity of power in this context may be defined as 
presence of differences in voting power, and homogeneity of 
~power may ·be defined as the absence of differences in voting 
~ 
~ower. The assumption behind this manipulation of voting power 
'I ~is that the more votes a subject is able to cast, the greater is 
•I 
~l1is power. 
:j' 
'. l 
I 
I The nurr~er of votes allotted to a particular subject (in 
la heterogeneous group) was determined by the position in the 
45 
I 
I 
! 
' subject's last name. The closer a subject's last I 
'1 
lalphabet of the 
·name was to the end of the alphabet, the greater the number of 
!votes which were allotted to him. For example, Adams would cast 
I 
I 
I 
Ii 
' I I 
i ione 
i ~and 
! 
vote, Baker two votes, Campbell three votes, Davis four votes, I' 
Edwards five votes. The assumption is that the position of a ~ 
! ~ 
" 
' ijperson 1 s last name in the alphabet is not associated with any 
fi ~particular psychological characteristics. It is apparent that 
!allocation of votes could have been determined by many other 
~ ~equally good and equally arbitrary methods. 
'· 
I 
! 
' 
the' I 
I 
I 
i 
I 
The procedure in all of the . 1 . . ! groups was practical y identi- ! 
fical. The only major difference in 
~ 
procedure related to voting in-I 
' tij 
~structions. 
~ 
For this reason, the step-by-step chronological p~o-
~ ~cedure which is described here should be assumed to apply to all 
~ ;groups unless otherwise indicated. ~ The procedure was as follows: ~ 
ij 1. 
~ 
The experimenter said to the subjects: 
For the next 45 minutes you will be partici-
pating in an experiment in social psychology 
which involves a 25 minute group discussion 
having to do with a human relations problem. 
I would like, first of all, to give each of 
you a copy of that problem. 
~ 2. The experimenter then distributed copies of the 
~ 
~problem and blank sheets of paper to the subjects. 
r 
~-·------------------------------_... ________________________ ~ ....... ~-·-·=-4--~~ ~.· r ! 
i'. 3. The experimenter then said to the subjects: ' 
\·.; ! 
11 ~ 
~ Print your full name in the upper right-hand ~ 
~ corner of the blank sheet. Read the problem j 
and the suggested solutions. Then rank the I 
solutions from best to poorest by writing oh i 
the blank sheet the letter of each of the I 
4. 
solutions and the rank of that solution so 
that the number "one" indicates the best 
solution, the number "two" indicates the 
second best solution, and so on up to five, 
which indicates the poorest solution. This 
ranking requires only the numbers from one 
to five and the letters A, B, c, D, and E. 
You have five minutes to read the problem 
and rank the suggested solutions. 
After the subjects ranked the solutions, the rank-
I 
I 
! 
~ 
i 
~ . [!ings (initial individual rankings) were collected. 
I 
I 
The copies of ~ 
1 l; 
!the problem and the suggested solutions were temporarily kept by 
~ 
~j 
~~ .. 
,tne subjects so that they might refer to them during the group 
., 
~ 
fdiscussion. 
ij 
fl 5 
. The experimenter then said to the subjects: 
You are to engage in a 25 minute group dis-
cussion concerning the human relations 
problem and the suggested solutions. During 
the course of this discussion, you are to 
produce a group ranking of the solutions. 
The form of the group ranking will be the 
same as that of the individual rankings. 
However, in this case, the group as a whole 
is to decide the rank of each of the solu-
tions. Because the discussion is limited 
to 25 minutes, it would be well to spend 
about five minutes on each of the solutions. 
6a. At this point, the procedure was slightly different 
~ r~ 
i;for the two types of groups. The homogeneous groups were told: 
ri 
,l 
n 
~ 
I 
I I 
i 
r_. _____________________________ ._· ___ 4_7 
' 
The rank of each solution will be determined by 
majority vote. 
6b. The heterogeneous groups were told: 
The rank of each of the solutions will be 
determined by majority vote. However, in 
this experiment, different persons will 
have different numbers of votes. 
:: The experimenter then told each subject the number 
~ 
r: 
~of votes he would cast and the number of votes necessary for a 
,, 
!,decision. 
The experimenter then said: 
Let me stress that a majority of votes, but 
not necessarily a majority of voters, is 
required for a decision. 
~ 7a. The experimenter then said to the homogeneous 
µ 
~ 
['subjects: 
r ~ 
;1 
~subjects: 
Cards with letters will be used in this 
experiment for purposes of identification. 
Each person will place his card in front 
of himself. The cards were then dis-
tributed to the subjects. 
7b. The experimenter then said to the heterogeneous 
Cards with letters and the number of votes 
you will cast will be used in this experi-
ment. The letters are for purposes of 
identification. Each person will place his 
card in front of himself. 
The cards were then distributed to the subjects. 
I 
! 
I 
I I 
i 
I i 
I ~ 
~ I 
I j 
I i 
I 
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t; 
8. The experimenter then said to the subjects: 
I am going to record this discussion so 
that I will have a record of the inter-
action which takes place during the dis-
cussion. 
9. The experimenter then said: 
' The discussion will now begin. 
10. The subjects then engaged in a group discussion, in 
~the course of which a group ranking was produced. 
11. "While the discussion was in progress, it was being 
ti 
~ 
l 
i 
! 
,, recorded on the tape recorder, and the experimenter was recording l 
! 
t' the sequence of interaction. Each subject was identified by the 
.. letter which he had placed in front of himself. These letters i 
i fwere recorded on a sheet containing numbers from one to 300. 1 
iEach number represented the number which appeared on the counter I 
~of the tape recorder at any given time. The number on the counter' 
q 
ii 
~;changed once every six seconds, and there were enough numbers on 
t . 
'-iJ 
~the sheet to record the sequence of interaction during each 
~ 
f:group discussion. Every time a subject spoke, his letter was 
fj 
~ f;recorded on the space next to the appropriate number. If the 
~ 
izj 
~number on the counter changed while he was speaking, his letter ,, 
~ 
~was recorded each time the number changed. In this way the 
ri ~experimenter was able to obtain a measure of the amount of 
! 
1verbal conununication for each subject. 
·~ 
I I 
I 
I 
' i 
12. 
,1 (was collected. 
13. 
49 
When the group discussion ended, the group ranking 
The experimenter then said to the subjects: 
I will now pass out a questionnaire which I 
would like you to respond to. Print your 
full name in the upper right-hand corner of 
the first page. Write your letter and the 
numbers of votes you cast below your name. 
Answer all the items on the questionnaire, 
and hand it in when you have finished. 
~ ~ 
i 
I 
~ 
' [l
I 
i 
q 
I 
~ 
I 
F. 
14. ~ Copies of the questionnaire were then passed out to ~ 
I 
1the subjects. 
'· 
11 15. The subjects completed the questionnaire and handed 
tJ 
~ 
~them in. 
The items on the questionnaire have already been pre-
" ~ 
Jsented. The questionnaire measured the following dependent vari-
.. • l 
~ }ables: (1) morale, (2) opinion change, (3) perceived productiv-
~ 
~ity, (4) emergent leadership, (5) power and perceived amount of 
g 
itotal (verbal and nonverbal) communication, and (6) power and per-
~ceived influence attempts. A seventh dependent variable, dis-
~ 
~ ~tribution of participation, was measured by measuring the amount 
,, 
i: 
ti jOf verbal communication for each subject, as has already been 
~ 
~described, and then by analyzing these measures by statistical 
~ ~methods which will be described in detail in the statistics sec-
~ 
I . ytion. Suffice it to say here that the measurement of the amount 
~ ~of verbal communication for each subject made possible the 
'· 
I 
r 50 
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k N 
f, 
~determination of the distribution of participation {verbal com-
'· 
rmunication) in each of the groups and thus in each of the treat-
1{ , 
' :ment combinations. 
' 
'• 
., 
,, 
1· 
The heterogeneous subjects were measured on all the 
rdependent variables. 
~~ 
The homogeneous subjects were not measured 
., 
,, 
;on power and perceived influence attempts or power and perceived 
!! 
~~ 
(;amount of total conununication, but were measured on all t..~e other 
~1 
]dependent variables. 
>i • • ;:Statistics 
It is important to point out that in this study the unit 
j 
of statistical analysis was the group rather than the subjectq 
tas is more conunonly the case in psychological research. In this 
'I 
ii • 
1;study, as in small group research in general, the object of ~ 
~investigation was the interacting group rather than the indi-
R 
~ 
fidual. The scores of the members of a group were not indepen-
~ 
~dent of one another because they were the product of group 
~interaction. However, the scores of members of one group were 
·' r,, 
~independent of the scores of members of other groups even if the 
~ 
~embers of these groups were serving in the same treatment combi-
! 
ttnation. Thus, the number of degrees of freedom was based upon the 
~ 
rumber of groups rather than upon the number of subjects, and the 
~tatistical analysis in general was based upon groups rather 
~ ~pon subjects because, in this study, a group was considered to 
than 
bel 
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f• 
~the equivalent of a subject. (For example, the high dogmatism, 
i 
~heterogeneous power treatment combination was composed of five l 
Thus, I ~groups and 21 subjects. ~ 
~ 
In this case n=S rather than 21•) 
hn 
r; 
p 
every case, the scores of the members of a group were averaged 
t: 
~in order to obtain a score for each group on each variable. 
,. 
Each subject 1 s degree of opinion change was measured by 
;:calculating the rank-order correlation coefficient (rho) between 
; 
:< 
ithe initial individual ranking and the final individu?tl ranking 
~ ~ ~(item A on the questionnaire) for each subject. The higher the 
1! 
~positive correlation between these two rankings, the less opinion 
'.1 
f
1
change there was. After the rhos had been computed for each 
:i 
~ 
':subject, the rhos of the members of each group were averaged in 
,, 
t! 
f' 
:order to obtain a rho for each group. A 2 X 3 factorial analysis 
f; 
~ 10£ variance was then carried out. (Winer, 1962) 
fl i; ~ The morale items (items Bl, B2, B3, B4, BS, B6, and B7) 
• t 
d 
.1were analyzed separately and in groups in addition to an analysis 
!j 
~ l~ ~of the over-all measure of morale. In other words, the dependent 
'I ~variable of morale was broken up, for purposes of analysis, into , 
~ ~the seven items comprising it, and also into two groups of three 
~ 
!items each. The reason for this was that the experimenter felt 
~that each of these items measured something somewhat different 
!from what was measured by any of the other items. Thus, the 
~ q 
experimenter felt that it was necessary to analyze each item 
I 
~ ! 
I I 
I 
r 
I 
f; 
1 
l 
g 
~ 
~ 
I 
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~; 
:;separately as well as analyzing the over-all measure of morale.,. 
I 
·' 
i.e., all the items co~~ined. Since each of these items measured ~ 
~ 
;different aspects of morale, the experimenter believed that it was1 
I ,. 
::quite possible for differences on some items and groups of items 
., 
,to be significant, and for the differences on other items and 
;groups of i terns to be not significant. 
1 
'l 
~.l 
lj 
" ~ I 
i 
'l 
The items were categorized into three groups: (1) Item Bl, 
1which was a single item, but Which, in a sense, constituted a I 
~ 
l 1 'discrete category because it measured an aspect of morale which ., 
I 
ft 
'.the other groups of i terns did not measure, namely 11product satis- ! 
~laction. 11 This i tern measured satisfaction with the group ranking I 
in other words, satisfaction with the product of the task. ~ ~(2) Items B2, B3, and B4, which measured 11 discussion satisfaction,{· 
,, 
~ 
ii.e., satisfaction with the group discussion. The combination of ' 
] 
i! 
<;these three i terns will be referred to hereafter as B234. ~ 
tl 
\ 
(3) 
:rtems BS, B6, and B7 (This combination is ref erred to hereafter 
i 
~ 
,las B567), which measured 11 task satisfaction," i.e., satisfaction 
~: 
~vith the task, which involved a discussion of the merits of the 
ij 
~solutions, voting, and the production of a group ranking. 
~ 
ij As regards the separate analysis of the scores on each of ;~ 
~ 
fi 
9the items measuring morale, the scores of the members of each 
~ 
~ ~group were averaged to produce a group average, which as has 
~ ~ 
~already been stated, was considered to be the equivalent of the 
~ 
a 
~ 53 
\score of one subject. A 2 X 3 factorial analysis of vari~nce 
J ~ 
rwas then carried out for each morale ite:::n. 
g 
i ) As regards B234, the scores on items B2, B3, and B4 were 
! 
~averaged to produce a single, over-all score for each subject. 
~ 
~ 
~7he over-all scores of the members of each group were averaged to 
'.1 
~produce a group average for B234, and a 2 X 3 factorial analysis 
I 
~ ~of variance was then carried out. 
'J 
' 
The statistical procedure for 
~B567 was identical to that for B234. ; 
~ One over-all measure of morale, B-all, was calculated in 
~ ~similar fashion, i.e., by 
~ 
averaging the scores for each subject 
~on all the morale i terns • Averaging of subjects• scores was not 
I 
~necessary in the case of 
~ 
item Bl, as this involved only one item. i 
was the case with the other items and groups of· items measuring I F-As 
" ~ 
imorale, 2 X 3 factorial analyses of variance were carried out for 
IB-all and item Bl. 
Items C ("emergent leadership 11 ) and E ( 11 perceived pro-
ructivity") were analyzed in a similar fashion. Individual scores 
!were averaged to obtain group scores, and 2 X 3 factorial analyses! 
,, 
of variance were carried out. 
Items D ("power and perceived amount of total communi-
cation 11 ) and F ("power and perceived influence attempts") were 
analyzed in a somewhat different fashion. In the case of these 
items, each subject received a rating from all the members of the 
54 
i i 
fl ~ ~group (including himself). The first step was to average the I 
~ I i ratings of the members of each group for each subject so that 
leach subject received a group rating. The next step was to com- I 
!pute the correlation between amount of power and the group rating I 
!for each heterogeneous group. The measure of correlation used ti, 
i 
i ~was the rank-order correlation coefficient. The amount of power 
I ~for each subject was, of course, the number of votes he cast. 
I 
tJThe ratings were ranked in order of magnitude, as was amou:r-... t of 
~ 
' ~voting power. (In this particular case, the number of votes 
~ 
'which each subject cast and his rank on amount of power were 
~identical.) In this way it was possible to obtain a rank-order 
!correlation coefficient between amount of power and the ratings 
~on these two variables for each heterogeneous group. (It was, of I . 
course, not possible to obtain such correlations for the homo-
geneous groups because in these groups all subjects had an equal 
I t · f t· > Th h th d t amoun o vo ing power. e group r os were en use o carry 
out a single-factor analysis of variance for the heterogeneous 
~ 
~groups for these two variables. The only factor in this analysis 
~of variance was dogmatism. Heterogeneity of power was not a 
~ ~ 
factor because all the groups included in this analysis of vari-
ance were heterogeneous. 
In regard to the measure of the distribution of partici-
pation, the raw score for each subject on amount of verbal 
55 
r· 
j . . ~corrunun1cat1on was converted into a percentage of the total amount 
~ 
~ 
~ ~of verbal corrununication of his particular group. These percent-
~ 
~ ~ages were used in computing standard deviations for the distri-
~ 
~bution of the amount of verbal corrununication for each group. 
t.1 
~ ~These standard deviations were then used to carry out a 2 X 3 
I ~factorial analysis of variance for the distribution of partici-
~pation. 
\1 ~ After the analyses of variance had been carried out, a 
I 
;: number of Newman-Keuls tests were performed in order to ascertain 
lthe specific sources of significance in those cases where sig-
~ 
~ ~nificant differences were found. (Winer, 1962) 
~ ~ i All the tests of significance were two-tailed tests. ~ ~ 
~ 
I 
I ~ ~ ~ 
F 
CHAPTER IV 
Results 
Tables 6 and 7 present the treatment means for all the 
! 
I 
t 
~items and variables in this study. 
,; 
~ 
Table 8 presents 2 X 3 factorial analyses of variance for 
Bl ( 11 I was satisfied with the group ranking.") and item B2 
~("I was satisfied with the group discussion. 11 ) The main effects l 
f, I 
tof heterogeneity of power were found to be significant for item Bll 
' ~ ~ ' U(F = 5.98, p < .05). Since the mean for the homogeneous subjects · ~ I ~(X = 4.99) is larger than the mean for the heterogeneous subjects ij ~ ~ 
i(i( = 4.43) for item Bl, it may be concluded that the homogeneous I 
~subjects demonstrated significantly higher morale on item Bl than I 
~the heterogeneous subjects. Or, in other words, the homogeneous I 
~ ~subjects were significantly more "satisfied with the group ranking! 
~than were the heterogeneous subjects, i.e. they were significantly! 
~ I 
n ~higher in 11product satisfaction. 11 A Newman-Keuls test was per-
~formed in order to ascertain the specific sources of significance. 
~ ~No significant differences were found. None of the other F values! i 
lfor these two items were found to be significant. 
~ I Table 9 presents 2 X 3 factorial analyses of variance for 
~item B3 ("The group discussion could be described as friendly.") 
~ ~and item B4 ("The group discussion could be described as hostile 
56 
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TABLE 6 
Treatment Means for Measures of Dependent Variables: 
A, Bl, B2, B3, B4, BS, B6, and B7 
Treatments N A Bl B2 B3 B4 BS B6 B7 
Heterogeneous 
High Dogmatism 5 .717 4.62 4.92 5.00 5.24 5.28 4.76 4.98 
Medium Dogmatism 5 .523 4.35 4.25 4.76 5.08 4.92 4.76 4.52 
Low Dogmatism 5 .766 4.32 4.90 5.15 4.68 5.40 5.17 4.93 
Homogeneous 
High Dogmatism 5 .467 5.21 4.44 4.94 5.18 4.28 4.37 4.33 
Medium Dogmatism 5 .587 4.97 4.45 4.92 5.28 4.64 4.07 4.43 
Low Dogmatism .5 .714 4.81 5.10 5.11 4.73 3.80 4.29 4.42 
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TABLE 7 
Treatment Means for Measures of Dependent Variables: 
B234, B567, B-all, C, D, E, F, and DP 
Treatments N B234 B567 B-all c D E F DP 
Heterogeneous 
High Dogmatism 5 5.05 5.01 4.97 .624 -.335 3.88 -.035 12.31 
Medium Dogmatism 5 4.70 4.73 4.66 .520 +.155 3.74 +.100 10.68 
Low Dogmatism 5 4.91 5.17 4.94 .434 +.040 4.00 +.175 13.20 
Homogeneous 
High Dogmatism 5 4.85 4.33 4.68 .540 4.06 11.44 
Medium Dogmatism 5 4.88 4.38 4.68 .492 3.60 12.26 
Low Dogmatism 5 4.98 ~.17 4.61 .272 3.87 9.74 
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TABLE 8 
Summary Table: 2 X 3 Factorial Analyses of Variance-Items Bl 
(Satisfaction with Group Ranking) and B2 
(Satisfaction with Group Discussion) 
·======================================================== Bl B2 
Source df MS F MS F 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
;~ 
!,A (heterogeneity) 
~\ 
::B (dogmatism) 
~ 
' lA X B ; 
tWi thin Cell 
~ 
H ~ 
~ 
~ 
' ~Total 
~ 
l 2.39 
2 .32 
2 0 
24 .40 
29 
5.98* 0 0 
.80 1.05 2.14 
0 .38 • 78 
.49 
tl 
,I 
!~ ~Total 
~ 
g 
I 
TABLE 9 
Summary Table: 2 X 3 Factorial Analyses of Variance-
Items B3 (Friendliness of Group Discussion) and B4 
Hostility and Antagonism in Group Discussion) 
Source df 
1 
2 
2 
24 
29 
MS 
0 
.20 
.OS 
.80 
*p < .OS 
**p < .01 
B3 
F MS 
0 0 
.2S .80 
.06 .os 
1.11 
B4 
60 
F 
0 
.72 
.04 
61 
~ 
:, and antagonistic. 11 ) None of the F values for these two items 
1Jwere found to be significant. 
II 
Table 10 presents 2 X 3 factorial analyses of variance for 
\i i tern BS ( "The task bored me. 11 ) and i tern B6 ("The task was enjoy-
\ 
il 
~able for me. 11 ) The main effect of heterogeneity of power were 
~ 
'• ~found to be significant for item BS (F a 9.96, p < .01) and 
,. 
8 
~ 
~item B6 (F = 14.76, p < .01). Since the mean for the hetero-
'.geneous subjects (X = S.20) is larger than the mean for the homo-
i' 
I ~geneous subjects (X = 4.24) for item BS, it may be concluded t..~at 
~ 
~the heterogeneous subjects demonstrated significantly higher 
ii 
~ ['morale on item BS than the homogeneous subjects. Or, in other 
1j 
! ~words, the heterogeneous subjects were significantly less "bored 
1 ~ ' ~by the task 11 than were the homogeneous subjects. A Newman-Keuls ! 
ii 11. ~ 
" ~test revealed that the difference of 1.60 between the means of j 
13.80 and 5.40 for the low dogmatism, homogeneous groups and the I 
elow dogmatism, heterogeneous groups, respectively, was significant!' 
~ 
6 ~beyond the .01 level (Sq [2,24] = 1.47). I 
l x .99 i I It has already been stated that the main effects of hetero-1 
l~geneity of power were found to be significant for item B6. Since ,,~ the mean for the heterogeneous subjects (X = 4.90) is larger than 
~ I M ~the mean for the homogeneous subjects (X = 4.24) for item B6, it 8 
lmay be concluded that the heterogeneous subjects demonstrated I 
·significantly higher morale on item B6 than the homogeneous sub-
. jects. , Or, in other words, the heterogeneous subjects found the 
TABLE 10 
Surrunary Table: 2 X 3 Factorial Analyses of Variance-
Source 
iA (heterogeneity) 
rj 
" ;:B (Dogmatism) 
~ 
I' J }Within Cell 
Items BS (Boredom with Task) 
and B6 (Enjoyment of Task) 
df 
1 
2 
2 
24 
29 
BS 
MS 
6.88 
.10 
1.12 
.69 
*p < .OS 
**p < .01 
F 
9.96** 
.14 
1.62 
B6 
MS F 
3.10 14.76** 
.2S 1.19 
.20 .9S 
.21 
62 
63 r,,_...---------------------------------------,i 
task significantly more 11 enjoyable 11 than did the homogeneous 
subjects. A Newman-Keuls test revealed that the difference of 
.88 between the means of S.17 and 4.29 for the low dogmatism, 
heterogeneous groups and the low dogmatism, homogeneous groups, 
respectively, was significant beyond the .01 level (Sxg.
99 
~,24] 
i: [/= .81) and also that the difference of .69 between the means of 
~ 
~4.76 and 4.07 for the medium dogmatism, heterogeneous groups and 
,• 
. \! 
~the medium dogmatism, homogeneous groups, respectively, was sig-
~nificant beyond the .OS level (S_q 
; x .99 [2,24] = .61). None of the 
:other F values for items BS and B6 reached significance. 
~! 
Table 11 presents 2 X 3 factorial analyses of variance for 
:j 
~ 
!:item B7 ("The task was meaningless insofar as I was concerned. 11 ) 
::, 
~and B234, which measured "discussion satisfaction. 11 None of the 
I 
;1 
~F values for item B7 and B234 reached significance. 
11 ~ ~ Table 12 presents 2 X 3 factorial analyses of variance for 
~ 
~B-all, the overall measure of morale, and BS67, the measure of 
i11 task satisfaction." The main effects of heterogeneity of power 
~ lwere found to be significant for B567 (F = 8.41, p < .01). Since 
~the mean for the heterogeneous subjects (X = 4.97) is larger than 
I• 
the mean for the homogeneous subjects (X = 4.29) for BS67, it may 
be concluded that the heterogeneous subjects demonstrated signi-
lficantly higher morale with respect to B567 than the homogeneous 
subject. Or, in other words the heterogeneous subjects were 
TABLE 11 
Surrunary Table: 2 X 3 Factorial Analyses of Variance: 
Source 
(dogmatism) 
~AX B 
~ . h' 11 ~Wit in Ce 
I 
3 
~ ~ 1 ~Tota g 
I 
Item B7 (Meaninglessness of Task) 
and B234 (Discussion Satisfaction) 
df 
1 
2 
2 
24 
29 
MS 
1.30 
.12 
.20 
.58 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
B7 
F 
2.24 
.21 
.34 
B234 
MS 
0 
.08 
.08 
.31 
64 
F 
0 
.26 
.26 
65 
·~......,--------------------------------~ . 
' 
TABLE 12 
Summary Table: 2 X 3 Factorial Analyses of Variance-
B567 (Task Satisfaction) and B-all 
Source 
~ (heterogeneity) ~ 
'·' 
'.~B (dogmatism) 
~ 
t'wi thin Cell 
~ 
~·1 
~Total 
v il 
a 
(Overall Measure of Morale) 
df 
1 
2 
2 
24 
29 
MS 
3.45 
.08 
.22 
.41 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
B567 
F 
8.41** 
.20 
.54 
B-all 
MS 
.25 
.05 
.10 
.18 
F 
1.39 
.28 
.56 
66 
' :) significantly higher than the homogeneous subjects in 11 task 
~) 
~satisfaction. 11 
~ 
& 
A Newman-Keuls test revealed that the difference 
i I; 
I 
i 
i 
~of 1.00 between 
~ 
i 
the means of 5 .1 7 and 4 .1 7 for the low dogwa ti sm, i 
'j 
ii heterogeneous groups and the low dogmatism, homogeneous groups, 
~ 
··: ~respectively, was significant beyond the .05 level (S_q [2,24] 
r'. · x .99 ,, 
None of the other F values for B-all and B567 reached 
r; significance. 
" t• :· 
5 
~ 
~ 
Table 13 presents 2 X 3 factorial analyses of variance 
~ ~item C ( 11 emergent leadership 11 ) and item A ( 11 opinion change 11 ). 
e 
for 
~ ~None of the F values for these two variables reached significance. 
,, 
~ ~ 
~ 
Table 14 presents 2 X 3 factorial analyses of variance for 
i ~ 
' ! 
I 
I 
i 
I ! 
~item E ( 11perceived productivity") and DP ("distribution of par-
lticipation"). None of the F values for these two variables ~eacheb I significance. 
I Table 15 presents single-factor analyses of variance (for 
tthe heterogeneous groups) for item D ( 11power and perceived amount 
I ~of total communication) and item F ( 11power and perceived influ-
ence attempts"). Neither of the F values for these two variables 
jreached significance. 
I 
67 
,........------------------------------........ ----....... ------------------......................... ----., 
TABLE 13 
Surrunary Table: 2 X 3 Factorial Analyses of Variance-
Items C (Emergent Leadership) 
and A (Opinion Change) 
c A 
Source df M§. F MS F 
;l 
;' )j 
~·A 
.(heterogeneity) 1 
., .045 .405 .100 2.50 
i' 
B (dogmatism) 2 .125 1.126 .075 1.875 
~ 
i1A X B 2 .020 .180 .075 1.875 
~ 
~ 
i] Within ; Cell 24 .111 .040 
~ ~ 
}! 
:1 ,, 
I' ~Total 29 
~ I 
~ 
*p < .05 
**p < ·.01 
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TABLE 14 
Surrunary Table: 2 X 3 Factorial Analyses of Variance-
Item E (Perceived Productivity) and DP 
Source 
A (heterogeneity) 
B (dogmatism) 
''AX B 
:I 
]Within Cell 
i 
.l 
~ 
' 
'l 
~Total 
11 
~ 
~ 
(Distribution of Participation) 
. df 
1 
2 
2 
24 
29 
MS 
0 
.28 
.08 
.16 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
E 
F 
0 
1.75 
.50 
MS 
6.53 
.30 
18.37 
15.75 
DP 
F 
.41 
.02 
1.17 
r 
! 
i 
I 
I< 
' 
I 
i 
' ' l 
i 
" J 
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TABLE 15 
Summary Table: Single-factor Analyses of Variance for the 
Heterogeneous Groups--Items D (Power and Perceived Amount 
" 'l 
Source 
~Dogmatism 
" ' i, 
2 
N 
•l 
~Exp. error 
' 
of Total Communication) and F 
(Power and Perceived Influence Attempts) 
2 
12 
14 
D 
.328 
.286 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
F 
1.15 .064 
.234 
F 
F 
.274 
J 
ti 
r 
r 
! CHAPTER V q 
! 
I 
Discussion u 
It would now be well to consider the results of this study 
;'in relation to the hypotheses which have been formulated. 
The first hypothesis was as follows: The greater an indi-
~'.vidual 1 s dogmatism, the greater is his resistance to opinion 
" ~~ 
" If h 
'1c ange. {! This hypothesis is supported by Rokeach and Vidulich 
·~ ij 
~(1960), Miller (1962), and Costin (1968). 
i-
i 
[lstudy failed to support this hypothesis. 
tj 
~ 
The results of this 
The second hypothesis was as follows: The greater the 
f.: 
1 ,, 
i 
l 
! 
f: j 
~ 
ti 
I 
i ~ 
~dogmatism of the members of small groups, the 
IJ 
il 
~incidence 
~ 
t greater is the I 
d 
This hypothesisj 
~ 
of emergent leadership in those groups. 
~is supported (indirectly) by Zagona and Zucher (1964). The 
~ 
lresults of this study failed to support this hypothesis. This is 
la hypothesis which this writer was probably not justified in 
&naking. It is supported by only one of the studies which have 
~ 
reen reviewed, and then only indirectly. (This was the only 
~study reviewed which dealt with this question either directly or 
I !indirectly.) . This hypothesis was based on theoretical considera-
ltions rather than on empirical findings. However, even on theo-
lretical grounds, the hypothesis is not too sound. This writer 
~ eld that the Dogmatism Scale is basically a measure of 
70 
71 
" ~authoritarianism, 
~ 
and authoritarian persons tend to be leader-
K • t d ::orien e • This writer still adheres to this view. However, a 
~ ~further assumption was made, namely that leaders will emerge in 
~I 
~ . 
'!highly dogmatic groups in response to the members' need for such 
:; 
it 
!;leadership. This assumption is now seen to be highly question-
R 
' 
·:;able because the mere need for leadership in no way insures that 
lj1eadership will emerge, particularly in view of the fact that the 
f1 ,, 
' 4group discussions lasted only about 25 minutes, and leadership , 
lj 
;j 
:;often takes considerable time to develop and manifest itself. 
> ~ The third hypothesis was as follows: Morale is higher in 
" .~ ~homogeneous groups than in heterogeneous groups. This hypothesis 
~ 
~is directly supported by Exline and Ziller (1959) and Carter and 
~Haythorn (1956), and indirectly supported by Gestinger and Thi-
lbaut ( 19_51) and Gerard ( 1953). The results of this study failed 
jto support this hypothesis. 
,, j It is interesting to note the results which bear on this 
lhypothesis, for they give a good picture of the results of this 
lstudy, for the only significant differences in this study were 
lwith respect to the measures of morale. No significant differ-
ences were found with respect to any of the other dependent vari-
iables. There were no significant differences as regards the 
overall measure of morale (B-all), and for this reason, the sig-
nif icant differences in morale which were found must be 
72 
hnterpreted with extreme caution and cannot be given ~-g::at deal ""l 
I 
f 
I 
.of weight. It should also be noted that all the significant 
differences in morale (and therefore in the study as a whole) 
''were between the two levels of heterogeneity; there were no signi-i 
" 
,]ficant differences between the three levels of dogmatism as 
'! 
Jregards either morale or any other dependent variable. 
' 
Three of 
::the four significant differences were in the direction opposite 
~j 
ilto that hypothesized, i.e., heterogeneous subjects demonstrated 
1 
~significantly higher morale than homogeneous subjects in three of 
I' 
' II 
~the four cases of significant differences (items BS [p < .01], 
,, 
~B6 [p < • 01 ] , and BS6 7 [p < • 01 ] ) • In only one of the four cases 
!i 
I' 
• [!of significant differences were the homogeneous subjects signifi-
M ~cantly higher in morale (item Bl [P < .OS]). ij 
" rl 
lj In order to properly interpret the results of this study 
in regard to the dogmatism variable, and also to gain an under-
!standing of the reasons for the failure to confirm the two hypo-
;theses concerning dogmatism, it is necessary to consider the 
H . 
!limitations of this study as they pertain to the dogmatism vari-
~able. Particular attention will be given in this discussion to 
~the limitations and imperfections of the Dogmatism Scale. 
~ I In the present study, the comparison was between those who 
~ 
lscored in the upper third, those who scored in the middle third, 
land those who scored in the lower third on the Dogmatism Scale. 
I 
~ 
~ 
' ;~ ~ 
;, 
jPerhaps the failure to confirm the hypotheses concerning dog-
" ~matism was the result, at least in part, of the selection of 
~ 
,1 
• [groups that did not differ sufficiently as regards their scores 
~ 
:, 
lj 
:ion the Dogmatism Scale, i.e., there may not have been sufficient 
'.i 
~ }contrast between the three dogmatism groups. If subjects had 
~ 
,; 
1been selected only from those persons whose scores were at the 
~ &extremes of the distribution of scores, there would perhaps have 
73 
' ~ 
i 
l Ii 
I 
~ j 
I 
I 
!.I 
. ~ 
I 
~ 
i'. ~ 
li 
' ~ ~been sufficient contrast between the three levels of dogmatism to n ~ ; 
t i ~"bring out" the expected relationships. r 
• f. 
u ~ ~ ~ ~ It should be emphasized that reliance on the·extremes of ~ 
;the distribution in no way implies that the relationships between I 
tJ 
r, 
~dogmatism in a "pure" and objective sense and various hypothetical! 
ff ~dependent variables are necessarily so tenuous that they can be 
"brought out" only in this manner. Rather, it is held that the 
lrelationships between Dogmatism, as measured by the Dogmatism 
ijScale, and various hypothetical dependent variables, are fre-
1 
~quently very tenuous because of the imperfections of the Scale, 
·and that if the Scale did not suffer from these imperfections 
~there would probably be no need to use the extremes of the dis-
tribution. 
A number of studies of dogmatism have, in fact, used only 
the extremes of the distribution. Only two examples will be 
given, but there are many other similar cases. Zagona and zucher 
! 
l ! 
I 
l 
I 
I i 
! l 
1 
·.""tr 
•, 
~~ 
I: (1964), in their study of dogmatism in relation to interaction 
~and role behavior, used two experimental groups of 30 each from 
[; 
' 
'i 
!;both ends of a distribution of 517 Dogmatism Scale scores. In 
ii 
H 
~a study by 
~ 
Rokeach and Vidulich (1960) of dogmatism in relation 
~to problem solving, the 30 highest scorers and the 30 lowest 
~ 
~ 1scorers on the Dogmatism Scale were selected from a pool of 
:l 1249 students. i The limitation which has just been discussed relates to 
lthe empirical testing of the hypotheses. The limitations which 
~will now be discussed relate to the interpretation of the 
!results. These limitations have to do with the imperfections of 
lthe Dogmatism Scale. Since the hypotheses in this study were 
74 
-, 
j 
i 
! 
I 
t 
' I 
! 
I 
J 
I 
I 
! 
I 
! 
l 
! I 
i 
'based upon studies which also used the Dogmatism Scale, the imoer-~ 
.. I 
fections of the Dogmatism Scale cannot logically be used to ex- I 
"plain the failure to confirm the hypotheses. However, because 
the validity of the Dogmatism Scale is less than ideal, the 
·interpretation of the results in any study which makes use of it 
are made somewhat difficult. It would therefore be well to 
critically examine the Dogmatism Scale in order to determine the 
ilimitations with respect to the interpretation of results. 
I One of the most serious and most obvious methodological 
defects of the Dogmatism Scale is that all the statements on the 
,•Scale are of a dogmatic nature, so that all 11 agreement responses 11 
I 
75 
r:~dicate dogmatism, and a::· "disag::ent responses'~indicate -1 
~ ~ ~non-dogmatism. Persons who have a tendency to agree with state- 1 
~ I ~ments will therefore tend to have high dogmatism scores, and per- ~ 
~ I ~sons who have a tendency to disagree with statements will tend to j 
~ I khave low dogmatism scores. In this way, tendencies to agree or ~ 
z 1·· ~ . ~disagree are confounded with the measure of dogmatism. The solu- I 
~ I 'l~tion would be to have an equal number of dogmatic and non-
1~ 
rj dogma tic statements mixed together in a random fashion. 
The Dogmatism Scale has been criticized by a number of 
~ ~writers on the grounds that its statements tend to be regarded as 
~ , 
~socially or personally undesirable by many persons, so that many 
I 
lpersons with a strong need for social and/or personal desir-
~ability tend to disagree with these statements, thus obtaining 
~ 
low dogmatism scores without necessarily being low in dogmatism 
(in an objective sense). In this way, according to these 
writers, the need for social and personal desirability is con-
founded with the measure of dogmatism. 
Two studies which dealt with this question and related 
·issues will, perhaps, shed some light on this subject. A study 
by Becker and Dileo (1967) investigated the relationship between 
scores on Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale and the response set to pre-
sent a positive social and personal image. The authors pointed 
.out that previous research has suggested that low scorers on the 
76 
if""'i 
il 
~Dogmatism Scale, which is positively keyed, obtain low scores 
w-1 
' ! 
11 
~ ~ ~because they tend to repress or deny 
il 
stat~~ents that are socially I 
!undesirable or reflect a negative self-image. In this study, 
~ ~216 undergraduate students were administered the Marlowe-Crowne 
~ 
~l ~ 
~Social Desirability Scale (social image) and the Worchel Self 
M 
;Activity Inventory (personal image) as well as Rokeach's Dogma-
• 
jtism Scale. Results indicated that: (1) Low scorers on the 
~Dogmatism Scale are not motivated differentially to present a 
~ ~positive social image, but are motivated differentially to 
ti ~present a positive personal image and in the direction expected; 
~ 
1 
iand (2) Males are more motivated to present a positive personal 
~image ·than are females, and females are more motivated to present 
a positive social image than are males. 
Becker (1967), in a study of ability to differentiate 
(message from source in relation to amount of dogmatism, found 
lthat subjects who had been classified as either low or high in 
dogmatism on the basis of their scores on the Dogmatism Scale 
depended relatively less on content and more on source than did 
Athose classified as medium. The author concluded that because of 
response set tendencies, the Dogmatism Scale is not a valid 
rectilinear predictor of closed-mindedness and correlates of 
closed-mindedness. 
,, 
" i 
~ 
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~ 
~ ~ 
~ 
~ 
A number of studies have, however, .found the Dogmatism 
b ~Scale to be a generally valid instrument. Two of these studies 
.. ~ ~will be presented in order to indicate the nature of these 
~ ~investigations and their findings. 
~ ~ Costin (1968), in a study of dogmatism and the retention 
~of psychological misconceptions, concluded that the results of 
~his study support Rokeach's view that the Dogmatism Scale does 
' ~ 
~measure general authoritarianism, rather than simple-mindedness 
• ~ 
I 
~and its consequent acquiescence • 
• i 
la measure of general authoritarianism, which involved a repli-
l ~cation of an earlier study by Rokeach. In this study, the Dogma-
~ 
Plant (1960) conducted a study of the Dogmatism Scale as 
~tism Scale, the Ethnocentrism Scale, and the California F Scale 
were administered to a number of college students. The £.S for . 
this study and the earlier one by Rokeach were similar, supportingl 
Rokeach's contention, according to the author, that the Dogmatism 
Scale is less loaded with prejudice and is a better measure of 
iauthoritarianism than the F Scale. 
The evidence from these studies, which may be considered 
to be fairly representative, and from other studies of a similar 
nature indicates that the Dogmatism Scale is a fairly valid 
instrument, although it suffers from the methodological defects 
1which have been described. Because of these methodological 
I I . 
. I 
.. 
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,:defects, the interpretation of results is made rather difficult. 
these relationships or, at the very least, casts doubt upon the 
strength of these relationships, even when one considers the 
limitations of this study in regard to the empirical testing of 
the hypotheses. Because of the qualified and tentative nature of 
this statement, it cannot be regarded as having the status of a 
conclusion. However, experimenters in this area must await fur-
ther refinements in the Dogmatism Scale before substantially 
stronger and more positive statements can be made. 
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J - i l It would now be well to consider the limitations of this I 
jl study with regard to the heterogeneity of power variable. i 
~ ~ ~ ;; 
~ In this study, the groups were not of equal size, each 1i 
.. l ~ ! ~group consisting of three, four, or five members. This ine- I 
!quality of group size did not violate the basic design of this I 
~study, nor did it violate any of its basic assumptions. However, . ~ ,. 
lthis inequality may be regarded as undesirable and far from ideal.! 
~.· 
IAs regards the heterogeneity of power variable, this study was 
~ ~ 
lconcerned with an absolute type of comparison, i.e., a comparison 
jbetween complete heterogeneity, in which no two persons had the 
~ 
'same amount of voting power, and complete homogeneity, in which 
everyone had the same amount of voting power. The study as it 
was actually conducted was able to adhere to this intended pur-
lpose. Because of this concern with an absolute type of compari-
son, the inequality of group size did not prevent the proper and 
.appropriate empirical testing of the hypotheses. However, there 
was a more subtle difficulty with regard to group size. The use 
~of groups of different sizes led to differences in the distribu-
ltion of power, so that the power relationships in the three-man 
~groups were different from those in the four-man groups, and both 
were different in this regard from the five-man groups. Thus, 
there was a lack of uniformity as regards the distribution of 
power, although it is difficult to determine how much, if at all, 
--
~ 
'I 
~this affected the results. 
H 
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The lack of uniformity of group size I :1 
~in itself constituted a possible 
! 
source of error which could have I 
j ~affected the dogmatism factor as 
I 
much as the heterogeneity factor.I 
~ ~where ~ 
" r•·lhere 
g 
Securing groups of equal size is a problem in any case 
time and the number of subjects are relatively limited and 
the experimenter does not have full control over the nu.TLber 
' ~of subjects who sign up for a given experimental session and who 
I I 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
I 
!actually report to the experimental room for that given ' .!.. ! exp er imen '- ~ 
~ . ' ~session. This was I I the case in .the present study, and is the case 
n ! in many other studies of small group behavior. Uniformity of 
~ 
~group size is desirable, but the problem of obtaining it is not 
leasy one to solve. 
~ 
~ Another of the 
-I 
possible limitations of this study is the 
~possibility 
~ q 
that the subjects were insufficiently impressed by 
the power differences. In a study of this type, the mere pre-
sence of differences in power is not enough; the subjects must 
!also gerceive these differences. The manipulation of voting 
lpower may not have been enough to induce perceptions in the sub-
' j ects of power differences of sufficient magnitude. In other 
words, the heterogeneous groups may have perceived themselves as 
~ 
'being relatively homogeneous. The experimentally created power 
differences, as perceived by the subjects, may have been of such 
1
small magnitude that they were obscured by other factors, e.g., 
i 
I 
11 
~ an·: 
~ 
/1 
~; 
i 
I 
I 
! ~ 
I 
~ 
I 
~ 
I t. 
·~ 
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upersonality factors. For example, a subject with low voting 
~ ii 
~power might have possessed a commanding and dominating per-
~ ~ ~sonality, which would have given him a high degree of inter-
~ ~personal power, and a subject with high voting power might have 
~ . 
~possessed a very submissive personality, which would have 
; 
;limited him to a very low degree of interpersonal power. In such 
~ 
~a way, natural power differences or natural sources of power 
~ ~differences might have had the effect of cancelling out or neu-
~tralizing artificially established power differences, if the 
~ ~latter were not of sufficient strength, as might have been the 
!case in the present study. I 
~ This brings up the whole question• of artificially created ! 
~ ij 
lheterogeneity vs. natural heterogeneity, the type of heterogeneity~ 
lwhich is found outside the psychological laboratory, but which 
lmay be studied either outside or within the laboratory. Among the· 
studies already reviewed, the following studies concerned them-
selves exclusively with natural heterogeneity: Haythorn et al. 
(1956),.Hoffman (1959), Schutz (1958), Cattell, Saunders, and 
!Stice (1953), and Carter and Haythorn (1956). A number of types 
,of heterogeneity must be natural heterogeneity, e.g., hetero-
This ~geneity of personality, values, interests, and attitudes. 
writer has already stated that he believes that artificially 
(experimentally) created heterogeneity corresponds to and is 
82 
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isimilar to naturally occurring types of heterogeneity, and there ~ 
j is empirical support for this belief • While this writer continues I 
Ito adhere to this belief, it must be pointed out that there are a I 
!number of advantages to using natural heterogeneity, or, to put itl 
~the other way around, there are a number of disadvantages in usingj. 
!l ~ !~artificially created heterogeneity, which may account, in whole orl in part, for the lack of significant differences in regard to the I ~ i 
!heterogeneity of power variable. ; 
~ There has been some criticism of small group research in 
!general to the effect that there has been too much emphasis on 
~ ~artificial groups in artificial settings working on artificial 
~tasks, and that insufficient attention has been given to natural 
!groups in natural settings working on natural tasks. The present 
~ 
'discussion deals with only one part of this larger question. It 
I 
would be quite possible for the heterogeneity to be natural, but 
larger question of the natural vs. the artificial in small group 
research. However, the larger question has been raised in order 
to make the smaller question more meaningful by giving it proper 
.perspective and by indicating its.relationship to a larger area. 
There are, of course, implications here for future studies in the 
area of small group research. The shortcomings of artificially 
i 
~created heterogeneity are similar to the shortcomings of other 
~ {' 
'artificial features of smali group research. The solution is 
• 
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greater emphasis on the natural, without abandoning the study of 
artificial groups under artificial conditions. The latter type 
lof study often has the advantage of greater convenience and 
lfeasibility, and the results of most such studies are, in all 
iprobability, fairly sound, despite their obvious limitations. 
I I If natural heterogeneity of power had been used, the sub-
~1 jects might have been considerably more impressed with the power 
',differences, largely because of their greater realism. Another 
point that must be stressed is that natural heterogeneity is 
generally of far longer duration than artificially created heter-
ogeneity. In this study, the artificially created heterogeneity 
existed only for the duration of the group discussion, in most 
cases about 25 minutes. It is reasonable to assume that natural 
!heterogeneity has a far greater impact on people than does arti-
ficial heterogeneity because of its permanent or relatively per-
.manent nature, as contrasted with the brief and transitory 
nature of artificial heterogeneity. Because of its greater 
realism and longer duration, natural heterogeneity is likely, in 
most cases, to have a more profound influence upon subjects' 
behavior than artificial heterogeneity. In addition, natural 
heterogeneity does not run the risk of artificial heterogeneity, 
84 
~ ~namely that artificial differences with respect to a particular 
~ 
lcharacteristic may be neutralized or obscured by the presence of 
lnatural differences, as may have been the case in the present 
I study. 
I 
I Because of the limitations of this study with regard to the 
heterogeneity variable, it cannot be concluded that strong evi-
'dence has been found against the hypothesis that morale is higher 
L [;in homogeneous groups than in heterogeneous groups, but the 
~ 
validity of this hypothesis can be said to be somewhat doubtful 
on the basis of the negative findings in regard to it. For the 
• lsame reason, the lack of significant differences with regard to 
lthe other dependent variables does not constitute strong evidence against the existence of any of the relationships which this study" 
sought to discover, but does cast a measure of doubt upon their 
existence. 
CHAPTER VI 
Summary 
j 
The purpose of this study was to determine the 
I relationship~ 
~ i 
The hypotheses which were formulated were as follows: 
(1) The greater an individual 1 s dogmatism, the greater is 
(2) The greater the dogmatism of the members of small 
groups, the greater is the incidence of emergent leadership in 
those groups. 
(3) Morale is higher in homogeneous groups than in hetero-
geneous groups. 
The results of this study failed to support these hypo-
theses. The only significant differences in this study were 
between the homogeneous and heterogeneous groups on some of the 
measures of morale. Three of the four significant differences 
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lwere in the direction opposite to that hypothesized, and there 
twere no significant differences in regard to the overall measure 
iof morale. 
~ A number of the limitations of this study were discussed, 
'and it was concluded that because of that because of these limita-! 
I 
tions, strong evidence had not been found against the existence of! 
the hypothesized relationships and the other relationships which I 
' lthis study sought to discover. However, it was concluded that the~ 
I 
results of this study did cast some doubt upon the existence, or I 
at least the strength, of these relationships. I 
~-- 1. 
2. 
3. 
~4. 
bs. 6. 
~ I 1. t- 8. 
L9. 
1_· 10. 
+l: 
' 
+2: 
+3: 
I AGREE A LITTLE 
I AGREE ON THE WHOLE 
I AGREE VERY MUCH 
-1: 
-2: 
-3: 
.. 
I DISAGREE A LITTLE 
I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE 
I DISAGREE VERY MUCH 
The United States and Russia have just about nothing in 
conunon. 
The highest form of government is a democracy, and the 
highest form of democracy is the government run by those 
who are most intelligent. 
Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worth-
while goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the 
freedom of certain political groups. 
It is only natural that a person would have a much better 
acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he 
opposes. 
Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature. 
Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome 
place. 
Most people just don't give a damn for others. 
I would like it if I could find someone who would tell me 
how to solve my personal problems. 
It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of 
the future. 
There is much to be done and so little time to do it in. 
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20. 
21. 
22. 
~ 23. 
~ 24. 
L 2s. 
26. 
27. 
~- 28. 
~ 
1_· 29. 
30. 
31. 
Once I get wound up in a heated discussion, I just can't 
stop. 
In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat my-
self to make sure I am being understood. 
In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in 
what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what 
the others are saying. 
It.is bette~ to.be a dead.hero.than to be a live coward. ~ 
Whi~e.I d~n t like to admit this even to myself, my secret~ 
·ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or ' 
Beethoven, or Shakespeare. 
The main thing in life is for a person to want to do 
something important. 
If given a chance, I would do something of great benefit 
to the world. 
In the history of mankind there have been probably just a 
handful of really great thinkers. 
There are a number of people I have come to hate because 
of the things they stand for. 
A man who does not believe in some great cause has not 
really lived. 
It's only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or 
cause that life becomes meaningful. 
Of all the different philosophies which exist in this 
world, there is probably only one which is correct. 
A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is 
likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person. 
To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous 
because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side. 
When it comes to differences of opinion in religion, we 
must be careful not to compromise with those who believe 
differently from the way we do. 
In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he. 
considers primarily his own happiness. i 
The worst crime a person could commit is to attack pub- I 
licly the people who believe in the same thing he does. i 
In times like these, it is often necessary to be more on 
guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's 
own camp then by those in the opposing camp. 
A group which tolerates too much difference of opinion 
among its own members cannot exist for long. 
There are two kinds of people in this world: Those who 
are for the truth, and those who are against the truth~ 
My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to 
admit he is wrong. 
i ~ 32. 
~ ~ 33 ~- . 
~ ?, 
r-
~ ; 
34. 
!~ 35. 
r ~ ~ li- 36. 
I 
0 fi- 37. 
i 
• 38 • 
"-~ il-- 39. 
~ 
, 40. I 
A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is 
beneath contempt. 
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Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth 
the paper they are printed on. 
In this complicated world of ours, the only way we can 
know what is going on is to rely on leaders or experts 
can be trusted. 
It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what is 
going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions 
of those one respects. 
In the long run, the best way to live is to pick friends 
and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as 
one's own. 
The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is 
only the future that counts. 
If a man is to accomplish his mission in life, it is 
sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all. 11 
Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have dis-
cussed important social and moral problems don't really 
understand what's going on. 
Most people just don't know what's good for them. 
~ ; 
~ ~ 
maker I 
' ~ 
i 
" ~ 
~1 ~Bates, 
~ ~ 
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